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1 Introduction
Addressing economic problems by models of strategic interaction with an infinite
number of negligible individuals (non-atomic games for short) is now common and
much progress has been witnessed in the theory of large games over the last years.1
However, some fundamental questions remain unanswered:
1. Non-atomic games have equilibria in pure strategies (e.g. Schmeidler (1973) and
Mas-Colell (1984)); to what extent does this property hold in games with a large
finite number of players?
2. Are equilibria of non-atomic games limits of equilibria of large finite games?
As it has been discussed since the early days of the theory of non-atomic models
in economics (see Section 2 for a literature review), these issues are fundamental to
assert to what extent are non-atomic games a good idealization of games that, in
reality, have a large but finite set of players. In this paper we provide answers to
these questions.
We address these questions in the context of games with anonymous players, in
the sense that each player’s payoff function depends only on his own action and on
the distribution of actions chosen by the other players, with a compact set of possible
payoff functions; this latter condition means that, in such non-atomic games, there is
a bound on the diversity of players’ payoffs functions.2 We first focus on games with
finite action spaces.
1Recent papers on large games include Gradwohl and Reingold (2010), Khan, Rath, Sun, and Yu
(2013), Carmona and Podczeck (2014), Deb and Kalai (2015), Khan, Rath, Yu, and Zhang (2017),
Yang (2017) and Kalai and Shmaya (2018). See the references therein for further recent work and
Khan and Sun (2002) for a survey of earlier work.
2Kalai (2004) refers to the games we consider as semi-anonymous; the need for the qualifier
“semi” arises in his paper because, unlike us, he allows for incomplete information which, in turn,
allows that a player’s identity be encoded in his type. We note that elsewhere (e.g. Khan and Sun
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Regarding the first question above, we note that not all sufficiently large games
have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium as we show by an example. Thus, a generic
existence result is the best one can hope for. And, indeed, we show that all sufficiently
large games whose distribution of payoff functions is sufficiently close to a generic
distribution of payoff functions of a non-atomic game have a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Thus, the existence of equilibria in pure strategies, which is a general
property of non-atomic games, holds generically in games with a large finite number
of players. The notion of a generic set we use, which is that of an open and dense set,
gives a reasonable sense to the assertion that our generic existence result applies to
all but “exceptional” games.
We answer the second question above affirmatively. Indeed, we show that any
equilibrium (distribution) of any non-atomic game (with a compact set of possible
payoff functions) is asymptotically implementable in the following sense: There exists
a sequence of finite player games converging to the non-atomic game and a corre-
sponding sequence of pure strategy Nash equilibria whose distributions converge to
the equilibrium distribution of the non-atomic game.3 This holds for general non-
atomic games, not just the generic ones. This bears some surprise: It is well known
that there is often an “explosion” of Nash equilibria in the limit, which suggested that
limits of pure strategy Nash equilibria in sequences of finite-player games converging
to a given non-atomic game could form a proper subset of the equilibrium set of the
limit non-atomic game. As our result shows, this intuition is incorrect.
Our results go beyond existing results in important aspects. Results analogous to
ours have been obtained for pure strategy approximate equilibria, among others, by
Rashid (1983), Khan and Sun (1999), Kalai (2004), Carmona and Podczeck (2009),
Carmona and Podczeck (2012b) and Deb and Kalai (2015) (who have established
(1999)) the notion of “anonymous game” is reserved for non-atomic games specified by distributions
of players’ characteristics.
3This notion of “asymptotic implementation” is more specific than that in Khan and Sun (1996),
where “asymptotic implementation” signifies, in the sense of nonstandard analysis, a “transfer” of
any results for games with a hyperfinite Loeb spaces of players to games with a finite number of
players (see Loeb and Wolff (2015, p. 355)).
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the existence of pure strategy approximate equilibria in sufficiently large finite-player
games), and by Housman (1988) and Carmona and Podczeck (2012a) (who has estab-
lished the asymptotic implementation of equilibria of non-atomic in terms of approx-
imate equilibria of large finite-player games). These results left open the questions of
existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, which we now settled affirmatively in the
case of generic games, and asymptotic implementation in terms of pure strategy Nash
equilibria, which we have now settled affirmatively in the general case.
The importance of obtaining results for Nash equilibria of large finite-player games
and not just for approximate equilibria arises because the latter are not always ap-
pealing. To see this, consider a game where each player can choose either the number
0 or 1, and each player’s payoff is obtained by multiplying his action with the av-
erage choice of the entire population (i.e. including his own choice). If this game is
played by n players, then the pure strategy profile where each player chooses 0 is an
ε-equilibrium with ε = 1/n: Indeed, no player can change the average choice and,
thus, his payoff by more than 1/n by changing his own action. In contrast, there is
a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, namely the strategy in which all players
choose 1; this is, in fact, a strictly dominant strategy.
In contrast, this issue does not arise in our two main results and, consequently,
they provide a stronger sense under which non-atomic games are, indeed, a proper
idealization of games with a large but finite number of players.
We also consider the case where players’ actions can vary continuously, namely
by allowing for action spaces that can be any compact metric space. Our asymptotic
implementation result extends to this more general case. We also provide an extension
of our generic existence result for large finite-player games to the case of general
compact metric actions spaces. Specifically, this result establishes the generic existence
of mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are nearly pure in the sense that each player’s
mixed strategy is concentrated on a set of “small” diameter. In other words, it is
virtually impossible to distinguish such a nearly pure mixed strategy from a pure
strategy. We emphasize that these strategies are still Nash equilibria, i.e. best-replies
to themselves.
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In our companion paper, Carmona and Podczeck (2019), we show that, under
differentiability assumptions in the case where players’ actions can vary continuously,
mixed strategies can be completely dispensed with in our results. Here, however, play-
ers’ action sets can be finite or have isolated points and, therefore, no differentiability
assumptions are made and no differentiable methods are used. In fact, apart from the
requirement that the set of players’ payoff functions be compact, our description of
large games is completely standard.
The generality of our framework means that our results apply to many economic
problems. To illustrate, we present two economic applications to which our results
apply: The allocation, to a large number of individuals and through an anonymous
mechanism, of indivisible objects and schools. The formalization of both of these ap-
plications is quite general, meaning, in particular, that we do not restrict attention to
a particular mechanism or to a restricted set of players’ preferences. To illustrate that
our results extend to more restrictive formalizations, we also consider the allocation
of indivisible objects through a specific mechanism, the first-price auction, and when
players’ preferences are restricted to depend only on the probability and value of ob-
taining the object, and on the bid submitted. It is interesting to note that while a
general treatment of discontinuous large games is outside the scope of this paper, our
results extend to a setting, such as the one in this latter application, where players’
payoff functions are discontinuous.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the literature is provided in
Section 2. Section 3 contains some motivating examples. Our model is presented in
Section 4. Our results on the generic existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in
large finite-player games are in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider the asymptotic
implementation of equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games. The extension of
our results to the case of games with a compact action space is in Section 7. Section 8
contains our economic applications and Section 9 provides some concluding remarks.
The proofs of our results are in the Appendix.
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2 Literature review
The use in economics of models featuring a continuum of agents started with Aumann
(1964). Such models are convenient from a mathematical point of view, and a way
of expressing the idea, central to many economic applications, that each individual
alone cannot influence aggregate statistics such as the price level or, more generally,
the distributions of actions taken by all participants in a game.
But models with a continuum of agents are idealizations of reality which, of course,
features a finite number of people. Despite Aumann’s (1964) convincing arguments
in favor of non-atomic models, many were unconvinced and dismissed them as being
unrealistic;4 motivated or independently of the resulting debate, many found it natural
enough to ask what is the relationship between economic models featuring a large but
finite number of player and their non-atomic counterparts: For instance, Hildenbrand
(1970), Brown and Robinson (1972), Hildenbrand (1974), Mas-Colell (1985), Rashid
(1987) and Anderson (1991) in general equilibrium theory, and Rashid (1983), Green
(1984), Housman (1988), Rashid (1992), Khan and Sun (1996), Khan and Sun (1999),
Khan and Sun (2002), Kalai (2004) and Carmona and Podczeck (2009) in game theory.
We will focus on the latter strand of the literature in the remainder of this section.
One way of relating large finite-player and non-atomic games is to ask whether the
limit of a converging sequence of equilibria of finite-player games is an equilibrium in
the limit non-atomic game. This was shown to be the case by Green (1984); see also
Qiao and Yu (2014) for a recent result along these lines.
Asymptotic implementation, which is one of the foci of our paper, concerns the
other direction in the relationship between large finite-player and non-atomic games.
Namely, it starts with an equilibrium of the non-atomic game and asks whether
sufficiently large finite-player games close to it have (approximate) equilibria close
to the starting equilibrium. Bearing some repetition from the introduction, results
related to ours have been obtained by Housman (1988) and Carmona and Podczeck
4For instance, Koopmans (1974) refers to the work of Aumann (1964) and others as “fanciful”
and Georgescu-Roegen (1979) as “one of the most incriminating corpora delicti of empty mathema-
tization”. See Khan (2014) for an analysis of Georgescu-Roegen’s (1979) criticism.
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(2012a), where the asymptotic implementation of equilibria of non-atomic in terms
of approximate equilibria of large finite-player games has been demonstrated. Our
contribution consists in dropping the “approximate” qualifier in those results.
A related way of relating large finite-player and non-atomic games is to ask
whether a property that is known to hold for non-atomic games, such as the exis-
tence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, also holds for all sufficiently large finite-player
games. Rashid (1983), Khan and Sun (1999), Kalai (2004), Carmona and Podczeck
(2009), Carmona and Podczeck (2012b) and Deb and Kalai (2015) have established
the existence of pure strategy approximate equilibria in sufficiently large finite-player
games; as above, our contribution consists in dropping the “approximate” qualifier in
those results in the generic case.
In several papers, including the recent ones of Khan, Rath, Sun, and Yu (2013),
Qiao and Yu (2014) and Khan, Rath, Yu, and Zhang (2017), non-atomic games are
described using an explicit set of players and a measurable function assigning payoff
functions to them. While we describe non-atomic games only by a distribution over
players’ payoff functions, our results can be easily translated to the former setting:
Indeed, the distribution of the payoff-assigning function is a non-atomic game in the
sense of our paper and the distribution of the payoff-assigning function and of a Nash
equilibrium (i.e. a measurable function from players to actions) is an equilibrium
distribution.
3 Motivating examples
Consider a large population of individuals who face a coordination problem. The
optimal choice of any individual depends on the choice of all others through their
influence on how popular each of the two options is.
Example 1. To make the example specific, assume that each individual in the pop-
ulation has to choose one of two options, 0 or 1; thus, there is a common action set
A = {0, 1}. The relative frequencies with which the options are chosen are described
by the vector pi = (pi0, pi1) in the unit simplex ∆ of R2; pi is referred to as the action
7
distribution. Half of the population has preferences that are maximized when the
action chosen matches the most frequent action. The payoff function of each of these
players is denoted by uc and is defined by setting, for each a ∈ A and pi ∈ ∆,
uc(a, pi) =
 pi0 − 12 if a = 0,0 if a = 1.
The remaining half of the population preferences that are maximized when the action
chosen matches the least frequent action. The payoff function of each of these players
is denoted by ud and is defined by setting, for each a ∈ A and pi ∈ ∆,
ud(a, pi) =
 12 − pi0 if a = 0,0 if a = 1.
Example 1 is specified without being explicit about the population of players. This
is done so that we can address the question of whether or not a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists when the above game is played by a sufficiently large population.
To this end, suppose that the above coordination game is played by a population of
n players, where n ∈ N, n ≥ 4 and even. Specifically, each of these n players chooses
one of the two options in A, half of them have payoff function uc and the remaining
half have payoff function ud. The action distribution that is relevant for each player
i is the average distribution induced by the choices of the others∑
j ̸=i
1aj
n− 1 ,
where aj is the action chosen by player j and 1aj ∈ ∆ equals (1, 0) if aj = 0 and (0, 1)
if aj = 1. Thus, the relative frequency with which action 0 is chosen by players other
than i is
ei :=
∑
j ̸=i
1aj(0)
n− 1 =
#({j 6= i : aj = 0})
n− 1 .
Example 1 shows that not all sufficiently large games have pure strategy Nash
equilibria. Specifically, the following property fails: There exists N ∈ N such that for
all n ≥ N , the n-player version of the game in Example 1 has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium.
8
To see this, let n ≥ 4 and even be given and suppose that a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Let C (resp. D) be the set of player with payoff
function uc (resp. ud). Consider i, i
′ ∈ C and suppose a∗i = 0 and a∗i′ = 1. Then, by
optimal choice of actions, ei ≥ 1/2 ≥ ei′ . On the other hand, calculating frequencies,
we see that a∗i = 0 and a
∗
i′ = 1 together imply that
ei =
#({j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : a∗j = 0})− 1
n− 1 <
#({j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : a∗j = 0})
n− 1 = ei′ ,
and from this contradiction it follows that all members of C must choose the same
action, say 0. But then, for all members i of D, ei ≥ n/2n−1 > 1/2 because #(C) = n/2,
so they all must play 1, by optimal choice of actions. This, however, means that, for
all members i of C, ei =
n/2−1
n−1 < 1/2 because #(C) = #(D) = n/2, so their optimal
actions are also equal to 1, and this contradiction shows that no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists.
Our results will show that the above example is non-generic. This conclusion is
illustrated easily in the following example.
Example 2. Consider a set of games parameterized by x ∈ [0, 1]. Specifically, for
each x ∈ [0, 1], define a game as in Example 1 except that ud(1, pi) = −x2 for each
pi ∈ ∆. In particular, note that the game in Example 1 corresponds to x = 0.
Consider a sequence of n-player games such that, for each n ∈ N, each player
has payoff function uc or ud, and the fraction of players having payoff function uc
converges to 1/2. We now show that for each x ∈ [0, 1] \ {0}, there is an N ∈ N
such that each game in the sequence has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium whenever
n ≥ N ; hence, this conclusion holds in an open and dense subset of the parameter
space.5
To see this, let n ∈ N be given and Cn (resp. Dn) be the set of players with payoff
function uc (resp. ud). Define a
∗
n = (a
∗
n,1, . . . , a
∗
n,n) as follows: a
∗
n,i = 0 for all players
5The need to have a large number of players can be seen by considering the matching pennies
game: This is a two-player game such that all 2-player games in an open neighborhood of itself have
a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.
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i ∈ Cn and for ηn players in Dn; a∗n,i = 1 for the remaining players. Letting νn be the
fraction of players having payoff function uc, pick ηn such that
1
2
<
nνn + ηn − 1
n− 1 ,
nνn + ηn − 1
n− 1 ≤
1 + x
2
, and
nνn + ηn
n− 1 ≥
1 + x
2
.
These inequalities imply that all players are best-replying in a∗n and, thus, that a
∗
n is
a Nash equilibrium: The first applies to players in Cn, the second to those players in
Dn who play 0 and the third to those players in Dn who play 1. The second and third
inequality hold if and only if ηn ∈ [γn, γn+1], where γn = (n−1)(1+x)2 −nνn; as there is
an integer in [γn, γn + 1], let ηn be one such integer. Since
ηn
n
≥ γn
n
→ x
2
> 0, ηn > 0
for all n sufficiently large. Also, for each n, ηn ≤ γn+1 ≤ n−1−nνn+1 = n−nνn =
n(1 − νn). Moreover, the first inequality holds if and only if ηn > n−12 − nνn + 1; as
limn
(
n−1
2n
− νn + 1n
)
= 0 < limn
γn
n
≤ limn ηnn , it follows that the first inequality is
also satisfied for all n sufficiently large.
Example 3. Consider the game of Example 1 played by a continuum of players.
In this case, the population is not explicitly described, but rather a distributional
view is adopted in that only the fraction of those players having a given payoff function
and choosing a given action is specified. An equilibrium distribution of this game is
a probability measure τ = (τ(uc,0), τ(uc,1), τ(ud,0), τ(ud,1)) on {uc, ud} × {0, 1} (with the
interpretation that τ(u,a) is the fraction of players with payoff function u and who
choose action a) such that, for each u ∈ {uc, ud}, τ(u,0) + τ(u,1) = 1/2 and, for each
(u, a) ∈ {uc, ud} × {0, 1} with τ(u,a) > 0, u(a, τA) ≥ u(a′, τA) for all a′ ∈ A (where
τA = (τ(uc,0)+ τ(ud,0), τ(uc,1)+ τ(ud,1)) ∈ ∆). It is easy to see that the set of equilibrium
distributions consists of τ such that τ(u,0) + τ(u,1) = 1/2 for each u ∈ {uc, ud} and
τA = (1/2, 1/2).
Consider, specifically, the following equilibrium distribution τ = (1/2, 0, 0, 1/2)
where all players with conformist preferences choose action 0 and all players with non-
conformist preferences choose actions 1. We now show that there exists a sequence
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of finite-player games, with a number of players going to infinity, and a correspond-
ing sequence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria such that the distribution over payoff
functions and actions induced by the allocation of payoff functions and the Nash
equilibrium converges to the equilibrium distribution τ of the non-atomic game.
To see the above, let n ∈ N, n ≥ 4 and even, and consider the n-player game where
half of the players have payoff function ud and the remaining half of the players have
payoff function unc defined by setting, for each a ∈ A and pi ∈ ∆,
unc (a, pi) =
 uc(0, pi) + 1n−1 if a = 0,ud(1, pi) if a = 1.
It is then easy to see that the n-player game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium fn
where all the players with payoff function unc play 0 and all the players with payoff
function ud play 1. Because 〈unc 〉 converges uniformly to uc, the distribution over
payoff functions and actions induced by the allocation of payoff functions and fn
converges to the equilibrium distribution τ of the non-atomic game.
4 Large Games
In this section we introduce notation and terminology needed to set up our framework.
It consists of the class of games where each player has a finite set of actions and a
payoff function that depends on his choice and on the probability distribution on the
set of actions induced by the choice of the other players.
4.1 Finite-player anonymous games
An anonymous game is defined as follows. There is a finite set I = {1, . . . , n} of
players. For each i ∈ I, player i’s action space is Ai, a nonempty subset of a finite
action universe A. A pure strategy of player i is an element ai of Ai. We denote
a generic element of
∏
i∈I Ai by a˜ and its kth component by a˜k. Given a profile
a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n) of pure strategies, and some pure strategy ai of player i ∈ I, we write
(ai, a˜−i) for (a˜1, . . . , a˜i−1, ai, a˜i+1, . . . , a˜n).
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For each i ∈ I, player i’s payoff function depends on the probability distribution
on the set of actions induced by the choice of the other players. The space of such
distributions is
(1) Ei =
{
pi ∈M(A) : pi = 1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1aj where aj ∈ Aj for all j ∈ I\{i}
}
,
where M(A) denotes the set of all probability measures on A; the set M(A) is iden-
tified with the standard unit simplex of R#(A) and endowed with its standard norm.
Also, in (1) and for each a ∈ A, 1a denotes the probability measure that assigns
probability one to {a}.
Player i’s payoff function is then given by ui : Ai × Ei → R, with ui(a, pi) being
player i’s payoff when he plays action a and faces the distribution pi on A induced by
the actions of all other players. The distribution on A induced by an action profile
a˜−i of all players other than i is 1n−1
∑
j∈I\{i} 1a˜j , i.e. it is the probability measure on
A with support {a˜j : j 6= i} such that, for each a in its support,
1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1a˜j(a) =
|{j 6= i : a˜j = a}|
n− 1
is the fraction of players other than i that play action a. Thus, given a pure strategy
profile a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n), the payoff of player i is
(2) Ui(a˜) = ui
a˜i, 1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1a˜j
 .
This concludes the definition of an anonymous game. In short, an anonymous game
can be described by the set of players I and the function G assigning to each player
his payoff function: G(i) = ui (player i’s action set equals the projection on A of the
domain of ui). We thus write (I,G) for the game just defined.
A pure strategy profile a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n) ∈
∏
i∈I Ai of an anonymous game (I,G)
is a Nash equilibrium of (I,G) if, for each i ∈ I and ai ∈ Ai, Ui(a˜) ≥ Ui(ai, a˜−i). It is
a strict equilibrium of (I,G) if, for each i ∈ I and ai ∈ Ai \ {a˜i}, Ui(a˜) > Ui(ai, a˜−i).
Analogously to what we did regarding players’ payoff functions, we often represent
a pure strategy profile a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n) as the function f : I → A defined by setting,
for each i ∈ I, f(i) = a˜i.
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4.2 Space of games
We let U denote the space of all continuous functions u : A′ ×M ′ → R where A′
is a nonempty subset of A and M ′ is a nonempty and closed subset of M(A). The
domain of u ∈ U is denoted by dom(u) and it is often written as Au×Mu. We endow
U with a metric d such that uk → u in U if and only if (a) dom(uk)→ dom(u) in the
Hausdorff metric topology and (b) uk(ak, pik) → u(a, pi) whenever (ak, pik) → (a, pi),
(a, pi) ∈ dom(u) and (ak, pik) ∈ dom(uk) for each k ∈ N; see Section A.3.1 for details.
Each anonymous game (I,G) defines a probability measure on ν(I,G) on U defined
by setting, for each Borel subset U of U ,
ν(I,G)(U) =
#({i ∈ I : G(i) ∈ U})
#(I)
.
Clearly, ν(I,G) has a finite support.
We let the space of games be the set M of all Borel probability measures on U
with compact support. We endow M with the topology such that νn → ν if both
νn → ν in the narrow topology and supp(νn) → supp(ν) in the Hausdorff metric
topology.6 The motivation for these choices is given in the following discussion and
examples.
Our results concern sequences 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N of finite-player anonymous games with
#(In)→∞. They are obtained by studying the limit ν of the sequence of distributions
〈ν(In,Gn)〉n∈N. One aspect of our convergence notion is that whether or not 〈ν(In,Gn)〉n∈N
converges to ν depends only on players’ payoffs at actions in their actions sets and
action distributions that can actually occur in those games; this would not be true
had we taken U to be the space of real-valued continuous functions on A×M(A).
The support of ν(In,Gn) is finite for all n but the support of ν need not be. We
focus on distributions ν on U with compact support. This is standard: In fact, the
assumption that the support of ν ∈ M is compact is equivalent to the standard
assumptions of a bounded and equicontinuous family of games (e.g. Rashid (1983),
6This two requirements mean that
∫
U hdνn →
∫
U hdν for each continuous and bounded real-
valued function h on U and that the Hausdorff distance between supp(νn) and supp(ν) goes to
zero.
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Carmona (2004) and Kalai (2004)). This is stated below in Lemma 1. In our setting,
U ⊆ U is equicontinuous if, for each ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that |u(a, pi)−u(a, pi′)| <
ε whenever u ∈ U , a ∈ A and pi, pi′ ∈M(A) are such that (a, pi), (a, pi′) ∈ dom(u) and
||pi − pi′|| < δ. Furthermore, U is bounded if there is B > 0 such that |u(a, pi)| ≤ B
whenever u ∈ U , a ∈ A and pi ∈M(A) are such that (a, pi) ∈ dom(u).
Lemma 1. Let U ⊆ U be closed. Then U is compact if and only if U is bounded and
equicontinuous.
One of the convergence requirement that we impose on sequences 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N
is that ν(In,Gn) → ν in the narrow topology. The narrow topology on M reflects the
topology of the underlying space U of possible payoff functions in the sense of treating
two distributions on U as close whenever they involve similar payoff functions with
similar frequencies; e.g., if µ =
∑m
k=1 αk1uk and µ
′ =
∑m
k=1 α
′
k1u′k are such that the
payoff functions uk and u
′
k are close in U for each k, and the frequencies αk and α′k
with which they occur are close for each k, then the distributions µ and µ′ are treated
as close by the narrow topology.
The narrow topology also regards µ and µ′ as close when, for some k, uk and u′k
are not close in U provided that both αk and α′k are sufficiently close to zero. This
means that when two distributions are close according to the narrow topology, there
may exist a set of payoff functions with small measure under one measure that are not
close to any payoff function in the support of the other. This possibility is eliminated
by requiring as we did in the definition of topology of M that supp(νn) → supp(ν)
in the Hausdorff metric topology for νn → ν.
As a result of the two requirements, every payoff function in the support of ν
is close to a payoff function in the support of ν(In,Gn) (and vice-versa) and their
frequencies are also close.
4.3 Non-atomic games
Non-atomic games are described without specifying explicitly its set of players. In-
stead, only the distribution of players’ payoff functions (and, implicity via their do-
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mains, of players’ action sets) is specified. Roughly, a non-atomic game is ν ∈ M
such that every u ∈ supp(ν) has the “right” domain as follows.7
For each u ∈ U , let the domain of u be denoted by Au ×Mu. Moreover, for each
probability measure τ on U × A, let τU be the marginal of τ on U and τA be the
marginal of τ on A. Then, for each ν ∈ M, the set of action distributions that can
arise is
E(ν) =
{
τA : τ is a probability measure on U × A such that
τU = ν and (u, a) ∈ supp(τ) implies a ∈ Au
}
.
Note that Mu, u ∈ supp(ν), plays no role in the definition of E(ν). Formally, a
non-atomic game is ν ∈M such that Mu = E(ν) for each u ∈ supp(ν).8
An equilibrium distribution of ν is a Borel probability measure τ on U × A such
that τU = ν and
τ({(u, a) ∈ U × A : a ∈ Au and u(a, τA) ≥ u(a′, τA) for all a′ ∈ Au}) = 1.
Letting, for each u ∈ supp(ν) and pi ∈Mu,
ϕ(u, pi) = {a ∈ Au : u(a, pi) = max
a′∈Au
u(a′, pi)},
the second requirement in the definition of an equilibrium distribution can be written
as supp(τ) ⊆ {(u, a) ∈ U × A : a ∈ ϕ(u, τA)}.
We use G to denote the set of all non-atomic games and give G the subspace
topology defined from that of M.
7Such games are also known as large distributionalized games as in e.g. Khan, Rath, Yu, and
Zhang (2017).
8For example, if A = {0, 1}, ν({u ∈ U : Au = {0}}) = 1/3 and ν({u ∈ U : Au = {0, 1}}) =
2/3, then E(ν) = {pi ∈ M(A) : pi0 ≥ 1/3}. Thus, the requirement that Mu = E(ν) for each
u ∈ supp(ν) means that payoff functions have a “minimal domain”: Payoffs are defined only for
the action distributions that can arise. Conversely, E(ν) ⊂ Mu means that u has been extended
beyond what is needed to analyze the game — but such extension is not needed and is, in this sense,
arbitrary. For this reason, as pointed out before, we want the convergence of 〈ν(In,Gn)〉n∈N to ν to
depends only on players’ payoffs at actions in their actions sets and action distributions that can
actually occur in those games.
15
5 Generic existence of pure strategy Nash equilib-
ria for finite action games
Example 1 shows that not all sufficiently large finite-player games have a pure strategy
Nash equilibria. More precisely, using the notation of Section 4, it shows that there
exists ν ∈ G and a sequence of finite-player games 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N with ν(In,Gn) → ν
and #(In) → ∞ such that, for each N ∈ N, there exists n ≥ N such that (In, Gn)
has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The above conclusion requires the choice of a special ν, namely ν({uc}) = 1/2 =
ν({ud}) in Example 1. Indeed, there are distributions µ ∈ G arbitrarily close to ν
such that each finite-player game (I,G) with ν(I,G) sufficiently close to µ and #(I)
sufficiently large has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This has been illustrated in
Example 2 by perturbing the function ud. Alternatively, this can be seen, for instance,
by letting µ({uc}) = θ ∈ Q ∩ (1/2, 1/2 + η) (where η > 0 is arbitrarily small),
µ({ud}) = 1 − θ and by considering, in the game (I,G) with #(I) = n and ν(I,G) =∑
u∈supp(µ) µ(u)1u|A×En (where En = {pi ∈ M(A) : pi0 = k/(n − 1) for some k =
0, . . . , n−1}), the pure strategy profile a∗ defined by setting a∗i = 0 if G(i) = uc|A×En
and a∗i = 1 if G(i) = ud|A×En . It is easy to see that this strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium (in fact, a strict equilibrium) of (I,G) provided that θ − 1
n
> 1
2
, i.e. that
#(I) is sufficiently large.
This discussion suggests that sufficiently large games whose distribution is suffi-
ciently close to a generic non-atomic game have pure strategy Nash equilibria. Theo-
rem 1 shows that this is indeed the case, thus answering the first question we posed
in the introduction.
Theorem 1. Suppose that A is finite. Then there is an open and dense subset G∗ of
G such that if ν ∈ G∗ and 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N is a sequence of games with ν(In,Gn) → ν and
#(In)→∞, then there is N ∈ N such that (In, Gn) has a strict equilibrium whenever
#(In) ≥ N .
Equivalently, Theorem 1 says that sufficiently large games whose distribution is
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sufficiently close to a generic non-atomic game have strict Nash equilibria. Formally:
For each ν ∈ G∗, there exists an open neighborhood O of ν and N ∈ N such that each
finite-player game (I,G) with ν(I,G) ∈ O and #(In) ≥ N has a strict equilibrium.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is as follows. Let G∗ be the subset of G
consisting of those ν that have a strict equilibrium distribution, i.e. some equilibrium
distribution τ such that #(ϕ(u, τA)) = 1 for each u ∈ supp(ν). Such strict equilibrium
distribution is then used to construct strict equilibria for sequences 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N of
finite-player games with ν(In,Gn) → ν and #(In) → ∞. The set G∗ is open in G for
a similar reason, namely the strict equilibrium distribution of ν is used to construct
strict equilibria of non-atomic games ν ′ with ν ′ close to ν. Furthermore, G∗ is dense
in G since, given an equilibrium distribution τ of ν, the payoff functions in supp(ν)
can be slightly perturbed to create a non-atomic game ν ′ close to ν and to create a
strict equilibrium τ ′ of ν ′.
6 Stability of equilibria of non-atomic games
Two issues regarding the stability of equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are
considered in this section: Their asymptotic implementation and the generic existence
of robust equilibrium distributions.
6.1 Asymptotic implementation
A classical issue regarding large games is whether or not the equilibrium behavior
of non-atomic games provides a good approximation of the equilibrium behavior of
similar large finite-player games. Indeed, non-atomic games are a tractable idealiza-
tion of large finite-player games and, thus, an affirmative answer to this question is
needed to justify them as an useful idealization. It turns out that the tools we have
developed to analyze the generic existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria of large
finite-player games are also useful to address this question, as we show in this section.
As discussed in the introduction, existing results show that equilibria of non-
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atomic games are limits of pure ε-equilibria of finite-player games.9 Can we obtain the
same conclusion with pure strategy Nash equilibria? The importance of this question
arises because ε-equilibria of large finite-player games are not necessarily appealing,
as it can be seen using the example discussed in the introduction.
Example 4. Let A = {0, 1}, n ∈ N and un(a, pi) = aa+(n−1)pi1n for each a ∈ A and pi ∈
M(A). Consider the finite-player game (In, Gn) with #(In) = n and Gn ≡ un|A×En
where En = {pi ∈ M(A) : pi1 = k/(n − 1) for some k = 0, . . . , n − 1}. It is easy to
see that the pure strategy profile where each player chooses 0 is an ε-equilibrium of
(In, Gn) with ε = 1/n. In contrast, (In, Gn) has a unique, strictly dominant, Nash
equilibrium, namely a∗ with a∗i = 1 for all i ∈ In.
Based on the above discussion, at the very least, we would like to have the existence
sequences of finite-player games converging to a given non-atomic game and having
pure strategy Nash equilibria whose distributions converge to a given equilibrium
distribution of the non-atomic game. Formally, let ν ∈ G and let τ be an equilibrium
distribution of the non-atomic game ν. We say that τ is asymptotically implementable
if there exists a sequence 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N of finite-player games such that #(In)→∞,
ν(In,Gn) → ν and, for all n larger than some N ∈ N, (In, Gn) has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium fn such that the sequence of distributions of the map (Gn, fn) converges
to τ narrowly.10
Theorem 2 shows that this property holds in general.
Theorem 2. Suppose that A is finite. Then every equilibrium distribution τ of every
non-atomic game ν ∈ G is asymptotically implementable.
Theorem 2 answers the second question we posed in the introduction by show-
ing that equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are limits of Nash equilibria
9A pure strategy profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) of an anonymous game (I,G) is an ε-equilibrium of
(I,G), ε > 0, if for each i ∈ I and ai ∈ Ai, Ui(a∗) ≥ Ui(ai, a∗−i)− ε.
10For each n ∈ N, the distribution of the map (Gn, fn) is the probability measure on U × A that
assigns probability #({i∈In:(Gn(i),fn(i))=(u,a)})n to each (u, a) ∈ Gn(In)× fn(In).
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of large finite games. It provides a justification for equilibrium distributions of non-
atomic games, namely that each such distribution is arbitrarily close to the distribu-
tion induced by a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a large finite-player game. This
property holds for each non-atomic game, not just for generic ones.
The idea for the proof of Theorem 2 is as follows. First, as already noted, given an
equilibrium distribution τ of a non-atomic game ν, the payoff functions in supp(ν) can
be slightly perturbed to create a non-atomic game ν ′ close to ν and to create a strict
equilibrium τ ′ of ν ′. We can then obtain a sequence of finite-player games converging
to ν ′ and extend the logic of Theorem 1 to get a corresponding sequence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria of these finite-player games whose distributions converge to
τ ′. Making τ ′ converge to τ completes the argument.
6.2 Robustness
Our results so far allow us also to define a more robust equilibrium concept for non-
atomic games and to obtain its generic existence.
Such equilibrium concept is obtained by requiring, for each sequence of finite-
player games converging to a given non-atomic game, the existence of a corresponding
sequence of pure strategy Nash equilibria whose distributions converge to a given
equilibrium distribution of the non-atomic game. Formally, let ν ∈ G and let τ be an
equilibrium distribution of the non-atomic game ν. We say that τ is asymptotically
robust if for each sequence 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N of finite-player games such that #(In)→∞
and ν(In,Gn) → ν, there exists N ∈ N such that, for all n ≥ N , (In, Gn) has a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium fn such that the sequence of distributions of the map
(Gn, fn) converges to τ narrowly.
It is not possible to obtain the existence of an asymptotically robust equilibrium
distribution for each non-atomic game ν ∈ G. This can be seem by letting A = {0, 1}
and u : A × M(A) → R such that u(a, pi) = pi1 for each a ∈ A and pi ∈ M(A)
and a non-atomic game ν be such that ν({u}) = 1. By considering the sequence
〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N with #(In) = n and Gn ≡ un : A× En → R where un(a, pi) = a+(n−1)pi1n
for each a ∈ A and pi ∈ En = {pi ∈M(A) : pi1 = k/(n−1) for some k = 0, . . . , n−1},
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it is clear that the only equilibrium distribution τ of ν that can satisfy the require-
ments of asymptotic robustness is such that τA = 11. But consider, for each n ∈ N,
uˆn : A × En → R defined by uˆn(1, pi) = 1/2+(n−1)pi1n and uˆn(0, pi) = 1+(n−1)pi1n for each
pi ∈ M(A) and (In, Gˆn). Then, ν(In,Gˆn) → ν and 0 is a dominant strategy for each
player in (In, Gˆn).
Nevertheless, Theorem 3 below establishes the generic existence of asymptotically
robust equilibrium distributions.
Theorem 3. Suppose that A is finite. Then there exists an open and dense subset G∗
of G such that each ν ∈ G∗ has an asymptotically robust equilibrium distribution.
Theorem 3 is a corollary of some of the arguments used in the proof of Theorems
1 and 2. The set G∗ is the same as in Theorem 1, namely the subset of G consisting
of those ν such that the non-atomic game with distribution ν has a strict equilibrium
distribution. The proof of Theorem 2 then shows that, given ν ∈ G∗ and a strict
equilibrium distribution τ of ν, each sequence of finite-player games converging to
ν has a corresponding sequence of pure strategy Nash equilibria whose distributions
converge to τ . Thus, τ is asymptotically robust.
7 General compact metric action spaces
In this section we extend our results by allowing players’ action spaces to be general
compact metric spaces. Thus, we assume in this section that players’ action universe
A is a compact metric space.
The space M(A) is now the space of Borel probability measures on A endowed
with the narrow topology. The space U is now the space of all continuous functions
u : A′ × M ′ → R where A′ is a nonempty and closed subset of A and M ′ is a
nonempty and closed subset of M(A); it is endowed with metric d such that, as
before, uk → u in U if and only if (a) dom(uk) → dom(u) in the Hausdorff metric
topology and (b) uk(ak, pik) → u(a, pi) whenever (ak, pik) → (a, pi), (a, pi) ∈ dom(u)
and (ak, pik) ∈ dom(uk) for each k ∈ N
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An anonymous game is still defined by a finite set of players I = {1, . . . , n} and
a function G : I → U assigning payoff functions to players, but where U is as in the
above paragraph.
We use mixed strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games in the extension
of our results to the case of a general compact metric action universe. To give some
intuition for the difficulties involved in this extension and for why we allow for mixed
strategies in the generic case, consider a non-atomic game ν where all players have the
same singleton set, e.g. {1/2}, as action space. Such game has a unique equilibrium
distribution which is trivially strict. Thus, when the universal action space A is finite,
ν ∈ G∗; consequently, any non-atomic game ν ′ sufficiently close to ν has a strict
equilibrium and any finite-player game (I,G) with ν(I,G) sufficiently close to ν and
#(I) sufficiently large has a strict equilibrium. However, these two conclusions fail
when A contains an open neighborhood of 1/2, e.g. when A = [0, 1]. For instance,
consider games (non-atomic or with finitely many players) in which (i) each player
has {1/2 − δn, 1/2 + δn} as action space, (ii) δn → 0, (iii) half of the players have
payoff function un,c, defined as the restriction of (a, pi) 7→ a
(∫
A
a′dpi(a′)− 1
2
)
to the
appropriate domain and (iv) half of the players have payoff function un,d = −un,c. It is
then easy to see that any such non-atomic game has no strict equilibrium distribution
(indeed, any equilibrium distribution τ is such that
∫
A
adτA(a) = 1/2 and, hence,
ϕ(u, τA) = Au for each u ∈ {un,c, un,d}). It is also easy to see that, analogously to
Example 1, any such finite-player game with an even number of players has no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
We will shortly return to the above example to see how mixed strategies that are
“nearly pure” are helpful. A mixed strategy of player i is an element σi of M(Ai),
where Ai = AG(i) (recall that the domain of u ∈ U is denoted by Au ×Mu). Given
a profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of mixed strategies, and some mixed strategy σ
′
i of player
i ∈ I, we write (σ′i, σ−i) for (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, . . . , σn). Furthermore, we let σ˜ =
σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σn, i.e., σ˜ is the product probability measure on
∏
i∈I Ai defined from the
measures σ1, . . . , σn.
Given a mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), the expected payoff of player
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i ∈ I is
(3) Ui(σ) =
∫
∏
j∈I Aj
ui
a˜i, 1
n− 1
∑
j∈I\{i}
1a˜j
 dσ˜(a˜),
where ui = G(i). A mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of an anonymous game
(I,G) is a Nash equilibrium of (I,G) if, for each i ∈ I and ai ∈ Ai, Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(ai, σ−i).
Returning to the above example, it is easy to see that, in a finite-player game
(In, Gn) satisfying (i)–(iv), σ
n such that σni = (11/2−δn + 11/2+δn)/2 for each i ∈ In is
a Nash equilibrium of (In, Gn) for each n ∈ N, since
Ui(ai, σ
n
−i) = ai
(∑
j ̸=i
δn
n− 1(σ
n
j (1/2 + δn)− σnj (1/2− δn))
)
= 0
for each a ∈ An and i ∈ In. This Nash equilibrium σn of (In, Gn) is “nearly pure”
in the sense that the support of σni , i ∈ In, is contained in a small neighborhood
of a pure strategy, namely the closed ball of radius δn of 1/2. Thus, by making n
sufficiently large, it becomes nearly impossible to distinguish σn from a pure strategy
profile.
Our next result shows that the above is true generically in the entire class of
games that we consider in this section. Given ε > 0, we say that a mixed strategy
profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of an anonymous game (I,G) is ε-concentrated if, for each
i ∈ I, diameter(supp(σi)) ≤ ε. Thus, in an ε-concentrated strategy profile σ and
given ai ∈ supp(σi) for each i ∈ I, there is a zero probability of a pure strategy profile
occurring in which some player plays an action whose distance is more than ε from
ai.
Our extension of Theorem 1 is as follows.
Theorem 4. Suppose that A is a compact metric space. Then, for each ε > 0, there
is an open dense subset G∗ε of G such that if ν ∈ G∗ε and 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N is a sequence
of games with ν(In,Gn) → ν and #(In) → ∞, then there is an N ∈ N such that
whenever #(In) ≥ N , (In, Gn) has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium σ such that σ
is ε-concentrated.
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Indeed, Theorem 4 extends Theorem 1 because, whenA is finite and ε is sufficiently
small, any ε-concentrated strategy profile is pure.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 1 but more
involved. In particular, the generic set G∗ consists roughly of the set of those ν ∈ G
that have a continuous symmetric strategy, i.e. a continuous s : supp(ν) → A, such
that, for each u ∈ supp(ν), no action outside a small neighborhood of s(u) belongs
to ϕ(u, ν ◦ s−1).11
We turn now to the asymptotic implementation of the equilibrium distributions
of non-atomic games, which we show to hold exactly as in Theorem 2. This is possible
because, given an equilibrium distribution τ of a non-atomic game ν, the payoff func-
tions in supp(ν) can be slightly perturbed to create a generic non-atomic game ν ′ close
to ν and to create a continuous symmetric equilibrium τ ′ of ν ′. We can then obtain
a sequence of finite-player games converging to ν ′ and get a corresponding sequence
of ε-concentrated mixed strategy Nash equilibria of these finite-player games whose
distributions converge to τ ′. By ensuring that, in the construction of ν ′ and of the
finite-player games, the “potentially optimal” actions (i.e. those in a small neighbor-
hood of s(u) for each u ∈ supp(ν ′)) are isolated, it follows that each ε-concentrated
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is pure; in this way, we obtain a sequence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the finite-player games whose distributions converge to τ ′.
Then making τ ′ converge to τ completes the argument.
Theorem 5. Suppose that A is a compact metric space. Then every equilibrium dis-
tribution τ of every non-atomic game ν ∈ G is asymptotically implementable.
8 Applications
We apply our results to two economic problems based on Azevedo and Budish (2019).
They consist of the allocation, to a large number of individuals and through an anony-
mous mechanism, of indivisible objects and schools. In both cases, we consider the
11The distribution ν ◦ s−1 over actions is defined by setting, for each Borel B ⊆ A, ν ◦ s−1(B) =
ν({u ∈ supp(ν) : s(u) ∈ B}). For the notion of a symmetric equilibrium see Mas-Colell (1984).
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case where individual preferences are unrestricted (beyond the assumption that each
individual’s payoff depends continuously only on his own action and on the distribu-
tion of actions chosen by the other individuals). In addition, for the allocation of an
indivisible object, we consider the case where individual preferences are restricted to
reflect the use of a specific mechanism, namely that of the first-price auction.
8.1 Allocation of indivisible objects
Consider the replication of the standard case where one object is allocated to one
of k > 1 individuals. Thus, there are n units of an object to be allocated between
nk individuals where n ∈ N. Each individual i ∈ In = {1, . . . , nk} desires at most
one unit of the object and makes a bid. Bids are discrete, non-negative and bounded
above. Thus, let A = {0, 1, . . . , a¯} where a¯ ∈ N \ {0} and Ai = A for each i ∈ In. The
allocation of the n units of the object is done anonymously so that each individual’s
allocation depends only on his own bid and on the distribution of bids made by the
other individuals. Thus, letting a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜nk) be a profile of bids, we let i’s payoff
be
ui
a˜i, 1
nk − 1
∑
j∈In\{i}
1a˜j
 .
In this formalization, each individual’s payoff function is, apart from the continuity
and anonymity requirements, unrestricted and, therefore, can depend on his own bid
and on the distribution of the bids of the other players in any arbitrary way. This
means that we are not restricting attention to a specific allocation mechanism, which
would describe whether or not an individual receives one unit of the object (or, more
generally, the probability of receiving the object) as a function of the bid profile.
Moreover, this formalization also allows for payoff functions that are not obtained
from preferences over the probability of consuming the object and the outcome of the
allocation mechanism. This gives a very general formalization of the problem, which
has the advantage that Theorems 1 and 2 apply to it.
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8.2 First-price auctions
Instead of allowing for the generality of the previous section, one may prefer to focus
on the case where a specific allocation mechanism is used and where individual pref-
erences are obtained from preferences over the probability of consuming the object
and the outcome of the allocation mechanism. In this case, not all functions in U can
arise as some player’s payoff function and, thus, our results need to be specialized to
the class of games having payoff functions that can arise.
We illustrate this issue for the case of first-price auctions. For each n ∈ N, each
individual i ∈ In has a valuation vi ∈ R+ for the object, so that he derives a payoff of
vi from the consumption of one unit of the good and zero otherwise. The first-price
auction works as follows. Given pi ∈M(A), let the market-clearing price be
p∗(pi) = max
{
p ∈ A :
∑
p′≥p
pi(p′) ≥ 1
k
}
;
in words, p∗(pi) is the highest price at which demand exceed supply. Indeed, for each
n ∈ N and action profile a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜nk),
∑
p′≥p pi(p
′) ≥ 1
k
is equivalent to #({i ∈
In : a˜i ≥ p}) ≥ n when pi(p) = #({i∈In:a˜i=p})nk for each p ∈ A. The probability that each
player obtains one unit of the object when his action is a ∈ A and the distribution of
actions is pi is
Φ(a, pi) =

1 if a > p∗(pi),
1
k
−∑p>p∗(pi) pi(p)
pi(p∗(pi)) if a = p
∗(pi),
0 if a < p∗(pi)
For each n ∈ N and bid profile a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜nk), player i’s payoff is then
ui
a˜i, 1
nk − 1
∑
j∈In\{i}
1a˜j
 = Φ(a˜i, 1
nk
nk∑
j=1
1a˜j
)
(vi − a˜i) .12
We will keep the allocation mechanism fixed and, thus, players’ payoff are deter-
mined by their valuations. Hence, in the context of this section, a game is probability
12Note that
∑nk
j=1 1a˜j
nk =
1a˜i
nk +
nk−1
nk
∑
j ̸=i 1a˜j
nk−1 for each i ∈ In; hence, for each player i, p∗, Φ and
i’s payoff depends only on i’s action and on the distribution of actions chosen by the players other
than i.
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measure ν on R+ with compact support. We let this set be denoted by G˜ and, as in
Section 4.2, endowed it with the topology such that νn → ν if both νn → ν in the
narrow topology and supp(νn) → supp(ν) in the Hausdorff metric topology. Finite-
player games are as in Section 4.1 except that now G maps the set of players I into
R+.
A difficulty with this setting is that all bids below the market-clearing price yield
a zero payoff and are, therefore, indifferent. This prevents us from obtaining the
(generic, asymptotic) existence of strict equilibria. But, apart from this issue, Theo-
rems 1 and 2 extend to this setting.
Theorem 6. There is an open and dense subset G˜∗ of G˜ such that if ν ∈ G˜∗ and
〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N is a sequence of games with ν(In,Gn) → ν and #(In)→∞, then there is
N ∈ N such that (In, Gn) has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium whenever #(In) ≥ N .
Theorem 7. Every equilibrium distribution τ of every non-atomic game ν ∈ G˜ is
asymptotically implementable.
The idea of the proof of Theorems 6 and 7 is analogous to that of Theorems 1
and 2 with the following important differences. First, it is now impossible to make
certain actions be strict best-replies, namely those actions below the market-clearing
price. This issue arise because of the narrow set of payoff functions allowed, which also
complicates the denseness part of the argument. A final complication arises because
players’ payoff functions are not continuous as it can be seen by considering, when
a¯ ≥ 2, v = 3, pi = ( 1
k
)
12 +
(
k−1
k
)
10 and pij =
(
1
k
− 1
j
)
12 +
(
k−1
k
+ 1
j
)
10 for each j ∈
N\{0}; then pij → pi, p∗(pi) = 2, p∗(pij) = 0, Φ(1, pi)(v−1) = 0 and Φ(1, pij)(v−1) = 2
for each j ∈ N \ {0}.
The above difficulties are avoided by letting G˜∗ be the subset of G˜ consisting of
those ν that have an “essentially strict equilibrium distribution”, i.e. some equilibrium
distribution τ such that
∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) > 1/k and, for each u ∈ supp(ν),
ϕ(u, τA) =
{a} if Φ(a, τA) > 0 for some a ∈ A with (u, a) ∈ supp(τ),A0(τA) otherwise,
26
where A0(τA) = {a ∈ A : Φ(a, τA) = 0}. In short, the condition
∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) > 1/k
takes care of the continuity problem and the remaining condition takes case of the
non-strict problem by treating all actions in A0(τA) as one.
8.3 Allocation of schools
Consider, for each n ∈ N, ns schools, each with m ∈ N seats, and nk students, where
s, k ∈ N. Each student chooses one school and, as a result of the profile of choices,
he may or may not get a seat in the chosen school. We let An = { jns : j = 1, . . . , ns}
represent the set of schools. The set of players are the students: In = {1, . . . , nk}.
Each student’s action set is An and, given an action profile a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜nk) , student
i’s payoff is
ui
a˜i, 1
n− 1
∑
j∈In\{i}
1a˜j
 .
The interpretation of this formalization is analogous to the one in Section 8.1.
However, unlike it, here players’ action sets change with the number of players and,
in fact, its sequence converges to [0, 1] in the Hausdorff distance. Thus, we cannot use
Theorems 1 and 2 here, but Theorems 4 and 5 do apply to this problem.
9 Concluding remarks
The main message of this paper is that non-atomic games are closely related to, and
therefore are good idealizations of, large finite-player games. This has been established
for the standard framework of large games (where each player’s payoff functions de-
pends continuously on his action and on the entire distribution of actions chosen by
the other players) using the standard equilibrium concept — Nash equilibrium — in
both classes of games.
Our first set of results shows that a well-know property of non-atomic games
— existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria — extends generically to large finite-
player games. The “generic” qualification is unavoidable because the distribution of
players’ payoff functions in some games can prevent pure strategy Nash equilibria
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to exist in sufficiently large finite-player games. These examples being non-generic
means that the distribution of players’ payoff functions in any such example can be
slightly perturbed to give rise to a game where the existence of pure strategy Nash
equilibria in sufficiently large games is guaranteed in a robust way: This property is
not lost if the distribution of players’ payoff functions of the latter game is further
perturbed.
Our second set of results shows that equilibria of non-atomic games are limits of
equilibria of large finite games. This result holds for each equilibrium distribution of
each non-atomic game, not just for generic ones.
Our results are weaker in the case of games with a general compact metric action
space and require the presence of a small amount of mixing in the players’ choices.
We do not regard this as discouraging: The presence of infinitely many actions close
to each other creates difficulties for our approach — players have, in an informal
sense, too much choice. Under the differentiability assumptions made in Carmona
and Podczeck (2019), this is not a problem because, generically, optimal choices are
locally unique; here, in the absence of these assumptions, this problems creates the
need for the use of mixed strategies that are precisely concentrated in a set of actions
that are close to each other.
We leave for future research the question of whether or not mixed strategies can
be completely dispensed with in our generic asymptotic existence result in the general
case of a compact metric action universe. In addition, we also leave for future research
the question of whether or not our results can be extended to the case of incomplete
information as in Kalai (2004).
A Appendix
A.1 Roadmap
In this appendix we prove our results. Some additional notation is presented in Section
A.2. In Section A.3, several lemmas are stated and proved.
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We start with the details of the topology on the space U of payoff functions and
the characterization of its convergence notion in Lemma 2. Lemmas 3–5 then state
several properties of the space M. We then present a lemma, Lemma 6, stating that
each non-atomic game has a sequence of finite-player games converging to it; this is
a simple matter when players’ payoffs are assumed to be defined on the entire space
A×M(A) but it is more delicate when, as in this paper, this is not assumed.
Section A.3 also includes two lemmas (one for the case when A is finite and
another for the case when A is compact) where any equilibrium distributions of any
non-atomic games is approximated by equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games
having additional robustness properties: The latter are strict equilibrium distributions
in the finite case, and symmetric and continuous distributions in the compact case.
The proof of each of the results in the main text is presented in Section A.4.
Throughout this appendix it is assumed that A is a compact metric space unless
explicitly stated otherwise.
A.2 Notation
Given a compact metric space X, we use ξ to denote the Hausdorff distance on the
space of nonempty compact subsets of X. A more precise notation would be ξX ; we
omit the subscript but will be clear from the context what X is. The definition of ξ
is as follows: Given two nonempty compact subsets C and D of X,
ξ(C,D) = max{sup
x∈C
d(x,D), sup
x∈D
d(x,C)}
where d(x,D) = infx′∈D d(x, x′) and analogously for d(x,C), and where d denotes a
metric on X.
Likewise, given a separable metric space X, we let ρ denote the Huntingdon’s
metric on the space M(X) of Borel probability measures on X. It is defined as
follows: Let C(X) be the set of all real-valued continuous functions on X, and
let L = {h ∈ C(X) : ‖h‖ ≤ 1 and h is 1-Lipschitz}. Then ρ is defined by setting
ρ(µ, µ′) = sup{|∫ h dµ− ∫ h dµ′| : h ∈ L} for all µ,µ′ ∈M(X). Recall that this metric
induces the narrow topology. In the sequel, notions of open or closed balls in M(X)
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are always understood as referring to ρ. Note that because ρ is induced by a norm
on the set of all signed Borel measures on X, if gi and fi, i = 1, . . . , k, are elements
of M(X) with ρ(gi, fi) ≤ δ for all i, then ρ
(
1
k
∑k
i=1 gi,
1
k
∑k
i=1 fi
) ≤ δ. Note also that
by the definition of Huntingdon’s metric, if d(x, x′) ≤ δ for x, x′ ∈ X, where d is the
metric of X, then ρ(1x, 1x′) ≤ δ for the corresponding Dirac measures 1x and 1x′ .
A.3 Lemmata
A.3.1 Space U
Recall that U denotes the space of all continuous functions u : A′ ×M ′ → R where
A′ is a nonempty and closed subset of A and M ′ is a nonempty and closed subset of
M(A), and that dom(u) denotes the domain of u ∈ U . We identify any u ∈ U with its
graph: graph(u) = {(a, pi, α) ∈ A′×M ′×R : α = u(a, pi)}. As graph(u) is a nonempty
compact subset of A×M(A)× R for each u ∈ U , we identify U with a subset of the
space of nonempty and compact subsets of A×M(A)×R which, when endowed with
the Hausdorff distance, is a separable metric space. Thus, U is a separable metric
space. We let d denote the metric on U , defined by setting, for each u, v ∈ U , d(u, v)
to be the Hausdorff distance between graph(u) and graph(v).
Lemma 2. Let u, uk ∈ U for each k ∈ N. Then d(uk, u) → 0 if and only if (a)
dom(uk)→ dom(u) in the Hausdorff metric topology and (b) uk(xk)→ u(x) whenever
xk → x, x ∈ dom(u) and xk ∈ dom(uk) for each k ∈ N.
Proof. (Necessity) Suppose that d(uk, u) → 0. We have that ξ(dom(uk), dom(u)) ≤
ξ(graph(uk), graph(u)) for each k, which established (a). Regarding (b), we have that
(xk, uk(xk)) ∈ graph(uk) for each k ∈ N. Since uk → u, there exists 〈x′k〉 such that
x′k ∈ dom(u) for each k ∈ N, |uk(xk) − u(x′k)| → 0 and the distance between x′k and
xk also goes to zero. Thus, x
′
k → x, u(x′k) → u(x) (because u is continuous) and
|uk(xk)− u(x)| ≤ |uk(xk)− u(x′k)|+ |u(x′k)− u(x)| → 0. Therefore, uk(xk)→ u(x).
(Sufficiency) Suppose that (a) and (b) hold. It then follows immediately that
graph(u) ⊆ Li graph(uk).13 Suppose that (x, r) ∈ Ls graph(uk). Then for some se-
13Here and below, Li graph(uk) is the set of limits of sequences 〈(xk, rk)〉 such that (xk, rk) ∈
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quence 〈ni〉i∈N in N there are points xki ∈ dom(uki), i ∈ N, such that (xki , uki(xki))→
(x, r). From (a) we see that x ∈ dom(u). Again from (a), there is a sequence 〈xk〉k∈N
such that xk → x and xk ∈ dom(uk) for each k. Define a sequence 〈x′k〉k∈N by set-
ting x′k = xki if k = ki for some i, and x
′
k = xk otherwise. Then x
′
k ∈ dom(uk)
for each k and x′k → x, so (b) implies that uk(x′k) → u(x). In particular, we have
uki(xki) → u(x) and, therefore, r = u(x). Thus, Ls graph(uk) ⊆ graph(u) and it
follows that graph(u) = Ls graph(uk) = Li graph(uk).
Because dom(u) and dom(uk), k ∈ N, are all included in the compact setA×M(A),
and because the maps u and uk are continuous, (a) and (b) imply, in particular, that
the sets graph(u) and graph(uk), k ∈ N, are commonly included in a compact subset
of A ×M(A) × R, so the fact that graph(u) = Ls graph(uk) = Li graph(uk) implies
that d(uk, u) = ξ(graph(uk), graph(u))→ 0.
A.3.2 Space M
Lemma 3. Let 〈νn〉n∈N be a sequence in M and ν ∈ M. If νn → ν in the narrow
topology and, for each ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that supp(νn) ⊆ Bε(supp(ν))
for all n ≥ N , then supp(νn)→ supp(ν) in the Hausdorff metric topology.
Proof. Let ε > 0. It clearly suffices to show that there is N ∈ N such that, for each
n ≥ N and u ∈ supp(ν), there exists u′ ∈ supp(νn) such that d(u, u′) < 2ε.
Using the compactness of supp(ν), let u1, . . . , uJ ∈ supp(ν) be such that supp(ν) ⊆⋃J
j=1Bε(uj). For each j, we have that ν(Bε(uj)) > 0 since uj ∈ supp(ν). As νn → ν
in the narrow topology, ν(Bε(uj)) ≤ lim infn νn(Bε(uj)); thus, there is N ∈ N such
that, for each n ≥ N and j = 1, . . . , J , νn(Bε(uj)) > 0. This then implies that
Bε(uj) ∩ supp(νn) 6= ∅ for each n ≥ N and j = 1, . . . , J . Thus, for each n ≥ N and
u ∈ supp(ν), there exists u′ ∈ supp(νn) such that d(u, u′) < 2ε.
Lemma 4. If νk → ν ∈ M and 〈uk〉k∈N is a sequence in U with uk ∈ supp(νk) for
each k, then there is a subsequence 〈ukn〉n∈N of 〈uk〉k∈N and u ∈ supp(ν) such that
ukn → u.
graph(uk) for all k, and Ls graph(uk) is the set of cluster points of such sequences.
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Proof. By the choice of the topology on M, νk → ν ∈ M implies that supp(νk) →
supp(ν) in the Hausdorff metric topology. Thus if 〈uk〉 is a sequence in U with uk ∈
supp(νk) for each k, there is a sequence 〈u′k〉 in supp(ν) such that d(uk, u′k) → 0.
Now since supp(ν) is compact, 〈u′k〉 has a convergent subsequence, say with limit
u ∈ supp(ν). Evidently the corresponding subsequence of 〈uk〉 converges to u, too.
Recall that the domain of u ∈ U is denoted by Au ×Mu.
Lemma 5. The following holds:
(a) For every ν ∈ M, E(ν) is a compact convex subset of M(A) and E(ν) =∫
U M(Au)dν(u).
(b) If νn → ν in M, then E(νn)→ E(ν) for the Hausdorff metric on the set of all
non-empty compact subsets of M(A).
Proof. Clearly E(ν) is compact and convex for each ν ∈ M. For the other claims,
consider the correspondences Λ : U → 2A and θ : U → 2M(A) defined by setting
Λ(u) = Au and θ(u) =M(Au)
for each u ∈ U . Then Λ is a continuous correspondence with non-empty compact
values; in particular, graph(Λ) is closed.
We first claim that E(ν) =
∫
θ(u) dν(u) for each ν ∈M. To see this, let pi ∈ E(ν)
and τ ∈M(U ×A) be such that τA = pi, τU = ν and τ(graph(Λ)) = 1. There exists a
measurable function f : U →M(A) such that
(4) τ(B × C) =
∫
B
f(u)(C)dν(u) for each Borel B ⊆ U and Borel C ⊆ A.
In particular, 1 = τ(graph(Λ)) =
∫
U f(u)(Au)dν(u); hence, changing f in a ν-
negligible set if necessary, we may assume that f(u) ∈ M(Au) for each u ∈ U . Thus,
pi = τA =
∫
U fdν ∈
∫
U θdν.
Conversely, let pi ∈ ∫U θdν and let f : U → M(A) be a measurable selection of θ
such that pi =
∫
U fdν. Define τ ∈ M(U × A) by (4). Then τA =
∫
U fdν = pi, τU = ν
and τ(graph(Λ)) =
∫
U f(u)(Au)dν(u) = 1. Thus, pi ∈ E(ν).
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As for part (b) of the lemma, first note that θ is continuous and has non-empty
compact convex values. To see the continuity of θ (the remaining properties are clear),
take uk → u, which implies that Auk → Au. If pi ∈ M(Au), let pi′k → pi be such that
pi′k ∈ M(Au) has finite support for each k. For each k ∈ N and a′ ∈ supp(pi′k), there
exists a ∈ Auk such that d(a, a′) < ξ(Au, Auk) + 1/k; set pik({a}) = pi′k({a′}). Then
pik ∈ M(Auk) and ρ(pik, pi′k) ≤ ξ(Au, Auk) + 1/k; in particular, pik → pi. Conversely,
if pi = lim pikj with pikj ∈ M(Aukj ) for each j ∈ N, then pi(Bε(Au)) ≥ pi(Bε/2(Au)) ≥
lim supj pikj(Bε/2(Au)) = 1 for each ε > 0 since Aukj ⊆ Bε/2(Au) for all j sufficiently
large; hence, pi(Au) = pi(
⋂∞
l=1B1/l(Au)) = 1 and pi ∈M(Au).
Note also that M(A) is a subset of a Hausdorff locally convex space and let E ′
denote its dual. For each p ∈ E ′, the map u 7→ maxpi∈θ(u) p(pi) : U → R is continuous.
Moreover, this map is bounded because the values of θ are included in the compact
set M(A). Hence, for each p ∈ E ′, the map ν 7→ ∫U maxpi∈θ(u) p(pi) dν(u) : M→ R is
continuous.
We have
(5) max
pi∈∫U θ(u)dν(u) p(pi) =
∫
U
max
pi∈θ(u)
p(pi) dν(u) .
Indeed, let f be a measurable selection of θ such that
max
pi∈∫U θ(u)dν(u) p(pi) = p
(∫
U
f(u) dν(u)
)
and h be a measurable selection of θ such that p(h(u)) = maxpi∈θ(u) p(pi) for each
u ∈ U . Then
max
pi∈∫U θ(u)dν(u) p(pi) = p
(∫
U
f(u) dν(u)
)
=
∫
U
p(f(u)) dν(u) ≤
∫
U
max
pi∈θ(u)
p(pi) dν(u)
=
∫
U
p(h(u)) dν(u) = p
(∫
U
h(u) dν(u)
)
≤ max
pi∈∫U θ(u)dν(u) p(pi),
from which (5) follows.
It follows by (5) that, for each p ∈ E ′, the map ν 7→ maxpi∈∫U θ(u)dν(u) p(pi) : M→ R
is continuous. Because
∫
U θ(u) dν(u) is a non-empty convex and compact subset of
the compact set M(A) for each ν ∈ M, it follows from this that the map ν 7→
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∫
U θ(u) dν(u) is continuous for the Hausdorff metric on the set of all non-empty com-
pact subsets ofM(A) (see Castaing and Valadier (1977, Corollary II-22, p. 53)). Thus
we get (b), again by the equality established above.
A.3.3 Approximation of games
Lemma 6. For each µ ∈ G, there exists a sequence 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N of finite-player
games such that ν(In,Gn) → µ in M and #(In)→∞.
Proof. Let 〈µn〉n∈N be such that µn → µ narrowly and, for each n ∈ N, supp(µn) is a
finite subset of supp(µ) and µn({u}) ∈ Q for each u ∈ supp(µn). Note that Lemma 3
implies that µn → µ in the topology of M.
Fix n ∈ N and let kn ∈ N be such that, for each u ∈ supp(µn), µn({u}) = pu/kn for
some pu ∈ N. For each m ∈ N, let Mmknµn(u)(Au) be the set of pi ∈ M(Au) such that
pi has finite support and, for each a ∈ supp(pi), pi({a}) = l/(mknµn({u})) for some
0 ≤ l ≤ mknµn({u}). DefineMmknµn(u)−1(Au) analogously with mknµn(u)−1 in place
of mknµn(u). Pick mn ∈ N such that mnkn ≥ n, ξ(Mmnknµn(u)(Au),M(Au)) < 1/n
and ξ(Mmnknµn(u)−1(Au),M(Au)) < 1/n for each u ∈ supp(µn).
To see that suchmn exists, let pi ∈M(Au) and pick pi′ ∈M(Au) with finite support
such that ρ(pi, pi′) < (2n)−1. Write {a1, . . . , aL} = supp(pi′) and λl = pi′({al}) for
l = 1, . . . , L. Pick mn such that mnknµn(u) > 2nL for each u ∈ supp(µn). Moreover,
let j1 be the largest integer such that j1(mnknµn(u))
−1 ≤ λ1; for 1 < l < L, assuming
that j1, . . . , jl−1 have been chosen, let jl be the largest integer such that (j1 + · · · +
jl)(mnknµn(u))
−1 ≤ λ1 + · · · + λl. Finally, let jL be such that
∑L
l=1 jl = mnknµn(u).
It is then easy to show that |jl(mnknµn(u))−1 − λl| ≤ (mnknµn(u))−1 < (2nL)−1 for
each l = 1, . . . , L. Thus, p˜i defined by p˜i({al}) = jl(mnknµn(u))−1 for l = 1, . . . , L is
such that p˜i ∈ Mmnknµn(u)(Au) and ρ(pi′, p˜i) < (2n)−1. Do a similar construction with
mnknµn(u)− 1 in place of mnknµn(u).
For each n ∈ N, define (In, Gˆn) such that #(In) = mnkn ≥ n and ν(In,Gˆn) = µn
(i.e. mnknµn(u) players i ∈ In have Gˆn(i) = u for each u ∈ supp(µn)); (In, Gˆn) is not
necessarily a game because dom(Gˆn(i)) may fail to be Ai × Ei. For this reason, we
modify the function Gˆn as follows.
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Note that supp(µ) is bounded and equicontinuous by Lemma 1. Because supp(µ)
is bounded, we may assume that each u ∈ supp(µ) takes values in [1, 2]; then, for
each u ∈ supp(µ), define u˜ : Au ×M(A)→ [1, 2] by setting
u˜(a, pi) =
u(a, pi) if pi ∈ E(µ),infpi′∈E(µ) u(a,pi′)ρ(pi,pi′)d(pi,E(µ)) otherwise.
Because supp(µ) is equicontinuous, the proof of the theorem in Mandelkern (1990)
shows that U = {u˜ : u ∈ supp(µ)} is also bounded and equicontinuous.
We now define Gn as follows. Let i ∈ In be given. Denote Gˆn(i) by vi, dom(vi) by
Ai × E(µ) (recall that vi ∈ supp(µ)) and denote by En,i the set in (1) (note that n
in that formula needs to be replaced with #(In)). Define Gn(i) be the restriction of
v˜i to Ai × En,i.
We have that E(µn)→ E(µ) by Lemma 5. We claim that ξ(E(µn), En,i) ≤ 3/(n−
1) for each n ∈ N and i ∈ In. Indeed, letting ln = #(In) = mnkn,
E(µn) =
∑
u∈supp(µn)
µn(u)M(Au) and
En,i =
∑
u∈supp(µn):u̸=ui
lnµn(u)
ln − 1 Mlnµn(u)(Au) +
lnµn(ui)− 1
ln − 1 Mlnµn(u)−1(Aui).
Hence, for any pi ∈ E(µn), we have that pi =
∑
u∈supp(µn) µn(u)piu with piu ∈M(Au) for
each u ∈ supp(µn). Let pi′ui ∈Mlnµn(ui)−1(Aui) be such that ρ(piui , pi′ui) < 1/n and, for
each u ∈ supp(µn) with u 6= ui, let pi′u ∈ Mlnµn(u)(Au) be such that ρ(piu, pi′u) < 1/n.
Write µ′n(ui) =
lnµn(ui)−1
ln−1 and µ
′
n(u) =
lnµn(u)
ln−1 for each u ∈ supp(µn) with u 6= ui.
Define pi′ =
∑
u∈supp(µn) µn(u)pi
′
u and p˜i =
∑
u∈supp(µn) µ
′
n(u)pi
′
u. We have that p˜i ∈ En,i,
ρ(pi, pi′) ≤ 1
n
and
ρ(pi′, p˜i) ≤
∑
u∈supp(µn)
|µ′n(u)− µn(u)| =
1
ln − 1
 ∑
u∈supp(µn):u̸=ui
µn(u) + 1− µn(ui)

=
2(1− µn(ui))
ln − 1 ≤
2
ln − 1 ≤
2
n− 1 .
The argument to show that, for each element of En,i, there is an element of E(µn)
whose distance is no greater than 3/(n−1) is analogous, hence the conclusion follows.
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For each n ∈ N, let θn = ξ(E(µn), E(µ))+ 3/n and ω(θn) = supu∈U sup{|u(a, pi)−
u(a, pi′)| : a ∈ Au, pi, pi′ ∈ M(A), ||pi − pi′|| ≤ θn}. We have that ξ(E(µ), En,i) < θn for
each n ∈ N and i ∈ In, θn → 0 and ω(θn)→ 0 (because U is equicontinuous). Hence,
for each n ∈ N and i ∈ In, d(ui, uˆi) ≤ max{θn, ω(θn)}. Indeed, given (a, pi, ui(a, pi)) ∈
graph(ui), there exists pi
′ ∈ E(ν) such that ||pi − pi′|| < θn and, therefore,
|ui(a, pi)− uˆi(a, pi′)| = |u˜i(a, pi)− u˜i(a, pi′)| ≤ ω(θn).
The argument to show that, for each element of graph(uˆi), there is an element of
graph(ui) whose distance is no greater than max{θn, ω(θn)} is analogous, hence the
conclusion follows.
It then follows that both ρ(µn, ν(In,Gn)) and ξ(supp(µn), supp(ν(In,Gn))) are no
greater than max{θn, ω(θn)}. Since µn → µ in the topology of M, it then follows
that ν(In,Gn) → µ in the topology of M as well.
A.3.4 Approximation of equilibrium distributions
Case 1: A finite
Given ν ∈ G and an equilibrium distribution τ of ν, we say that τ is strict if
#(ϕ(u, τA)) = 1 for each u ∈ supp(ν). Let G∗ be the set of ν ∈ G that have a strict
equilibrium distribution.
Lemma 7. Suppose that A is finite. If ν ∈ G and τ is an equilibrium distribution
of ν, then there exists 〈(νn, τn)〉n∈N such that νn ∈ G∗ and τn is a strict equilibrium
distribution of νn for all n ∈ N, νn → ν in the topology of G and τn → τ narrowly.
Proof. Fix ν ∈ G and let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν. Note that supp(τ)
is compact. Given n ∈ N and (u, a) ∈ U × A, let uu,a,n ∈ U by defined by setting
dom(uu,a,n) = dom(u) and, for each (a
′, pi) ∈ Au ×Mu,
uu,a,n(a
′, pi) =

(
1− 1
n+1
)
u(a′, pi) + 1
n+1
if a′ = a(
1− 1
n+1
)
u(a′, pi) otherwise.
Define κn : U × A → U × A by setting κn(u, a) = (uu,a,n, a) for each (u, a) ∈ U × A.
Observe that κn is continuous for each n (because A is finite and d(uu,a,n, uv,a,n) ≤
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d(u, v) for each u, v ∈ U , a ∈ A and n ∈ N) and that κn → idU×A uniformly as
n→∞, writing idU×A for the identity on U ×A (because d(uu,a,n, u) ≤ 1/(n+ 1) for
each u ∈ U , a ∈ A and n ∈ N).
Let τn = τ ◦ κ−1n and νn the marginal measure of τn on U . Because projA ◦κn =
projA for each n, we have τn,A = τA for each n. Of course, supp(τ) ⊆ κ−1n (κn(supp(τ)))
for each n, hence
τ(supp(τ)) = 1 = τ(κ−1n (κn(supp(τ)))) = τn(κn(supp(τ))).
Consequently, supp(τn) ⊆ κn(supp(τ)), because supp(τ) and, hence, κn(supp(τ)) are
compact. Thus, if (u′, a′) ∈ supp(τn), then for some (u, a) ∈ supp(τ), u′ = uu,a,n and
a′ = a; but if (u, a) ∈ supp(τ), then a ∈ ϕ(u, τA) and {a} = ϕ(uu,a,n, τA) by the choice
of uu,a,n, i.e., {a′} = ϕ(u′, τA) = ϕ(u′, τn,A) because τA = τn,A. Moreover, we have that
νn ∈ G since ν ∈ G and, thus, Mu = E(ν) = E(νn) for each u ∈ supp(νn). It follows
that, for each n, τn is a strict equilibrium distribution for νn and that νn ∈ G∗.
Finally, note that the fact that κn → idU×A uniformly as n → ∞ implies that
τn → τ narrowly. In particular, νn → ν narrowly. As supp(τn) ⊆ κn(supp(τ))
and limn sup(u,a)∈U×A d(u, uu,a,n) = 0, it follows that, for each ε > 0, supp(νn) ⊆
Bε(supp(ν)) for all n sufficiently large. Thus, Lemma 3 implies that supp(νn) →
supp(ν). Consequently, νn → ν in the topology of G.
Case 2: A general compact metric space
Fix ε > 0 and ν ∈ G. We say that τ ∈ Sε(ν) if there is an open set V ⊆ U , with
supp(ν) ⊆ V , numbers η and δ, with 0 < η < δ ≤ ε/2, and a continuous function
s : V → A, with Au ∩ Bη(s(u)) 6= ∅ for each u ∈ V , such that τ = ν ◦ (idU , s)−1 and
u(a′, pi) > u(a, pi) for all u ∈ supp(ν), pi ∈ Bδ(ν ◦ s−1) ∩E(ν) a′ ∈ Au ∩Bη(s(u)) and
a ∈ Au\Bδ(s(u)). Let G∗ε be the set of ν ∈ G such that Sε(ν) 6= ∅; thus, G∗ε is the set
of ν ∈ G such that there exists V , η, δ and s as above.
Lemma 8. If ν ∈ G and τ is an equilibrium distribution of ν, then there exists
〈(εk, νk, τk)〉k∈N such that νk ∈ G∗εk and τk ∈ Sεk(νk) for all k ∈ N, εk → 0, νk → ν
in the topology of G and τk → τ narrowly. Furthermore, for each k ∈ N, νk can be
chosen such that d(a, a′) > εk for all a, a′ ∈ Au and u ∈ supp(νk).
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Proof. Fix ν ∈ G and let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν. Note that supp(τ)
is compact. Let 〈τˆk〉 be a sequence of probability measures on U × A with τˆk → τ
narrowly such that each τˆk has a finite support included in supp(τ). Write νˆk for the
marginal measure of τˆk on U and note that νˆk → ν narrowly. Since supp(τˆk) ⊆ supp(τ)
for all k, it follows that supp(νˆk) ⊆ supp(ν) for all k. Hence, as νˆk → ν narrowly, we
also have supp(νˆk) → supp(ν) in the Hausdorff metric topology by Lemma 3. Thus
νˆk → ν in the topology of G.
Note that supp(µ) is bounded and equicontinuous by Lemma 1. Because supp(µ)
is bounded, we may assume that each u ∈ supp(µ) takes values in [1, 2]; then, for
each u ∈ supp(µ), define u˜ : Au ×M(A)→ [1, 2] by setting
u˜(a, pi) =
u(a, pi) if pi ∈ E(µ),infpi′∈E(µ) u(a,pi′)ρ(pi,pi′)d(pi,E(µ)) otherwise.
Because supp(µ) is equicontinuous, the proof of the theorem in Mandelkern (1990)
shows that U = {u˜ : u ∈ supp(µ)} is also bounded and equicontinuous.
Write νˆk =
∑i′k
i=1 α
′
i1uˆi and Ai for the projection of dom(uˆi) in A. Then define
ui to be the restriction of ˜ˆui to Ai × E(νˆk) and let ν ′k =
∑i′k
i=1 α
′
i1ui . Noting that
E(νˆk) = E(ν
′
k) =
∑i′k
i=1 α
′
iM(Ai), we have that ν
′
k ∈ G.
We have that E(νˆk) → E(ν) by Lemma 5 and, thus, E(ν ′k) → E(ν). Arguing as
in the proof of Lemma 6, we have that ν ′k → ν in the topology of G.
Moreover, for each k ∈ N, write τˆk =
∑ik
i=1 αi1(uˆi,ai) and let τ
′
k =
∑ik
i=1 αi1(ui,ai).
Then, we also have that τ ′k → τ narrowly and supp(τ ′k) → supp(τ) in the Hausdorff
metric topology. In addition, for each k ∈ N and (u, a) ∈ supp(τˆk), a ∈ Au since
(u, a) ∈ supp(τ) and τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν; hence τ ′k,A = τˆk,A ∈ E(ν ′k).
Note that τ ′k,A → τA. For each k set
γk = max{u(a′, τ ′k,A)− u(a, τ ′k,A) : (u, a) ∈ supp(τ ′k), a′ ∈ Au}.
Then γk → 0 because τ is an equilibrium distribution for ν, τ ′k,A → τA and U is
equicontinuous.
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Fix k and write
τ ′k =
ik∑
i=1
αi1(ui,ai) =
i′k∑
i=1
α′i
hi∑
h=1
αi,h1(ui,ai,h).
We have ui(ai,h, τ
′
k,A) > ui(a, τ
′
k,A) −
(
γk +
1
k
)
for each a ∈ A and each (i, h). Put
εk = 2
(
γk +
1
k
)
. Now there is 0 < δk ≤ εk/2 such that for each (i, h), ui(ai,h, pi) >
ui(a, pi) − εk for each pi ∈ Bδk(τ ′k,A) and a ∈ A. For each (i, h), choose a continuous
function λi,h : A→ R+, with λi,h(ai,h) = 2εk, λi,h ≤ 2εk and λi,h = 0 on Ai\Bδk(ai,h),
and define ui,h by setting ui,h = ui + λi,h.
Thus, ui,h(ai,h, pi) > ui,h(a, pi) + εk for each pi ∈ Bδk(τ ′k,A) and a ∈ Ai\Bδk(ai,h).
Choose 0 < ηk < δk such that ui,h(a
′, pi) > ui,h(a, pi) + εk for each pi ∈ Bδk(τ ′k,A),
a′ ∈ Ai ∩Bηk(ai,h) and a ∈ Ai\Bδk(ai,h).
Let Aki,h ⊆ Ai be such that ξ(Aki,h, Ai) < 2εk, ai,h ∈ Ai,h and d(a, a′) > εk for each
a, a′ ∈ Aki,h. To see that Aki,h exists, let {a1, . . . , am} ⊆ Ai be such that a1 = ai,h and
Ai ⊆ ∪mj=1Bεk(aj); this is possible because Ai is compact. Let J1 = {1, . . . ,m} and,
for each 1 < j ≤ m, let J j = J j−1 if d(aj, al) > εk for all l ∈ J j−1 ∩{1, . . . , j− 1} and
J j = J j−1 \ {aj} otherwise. Letting Aki,h = {aj : j ∈ Jm}, we see that d(a, a′) > εk for
all a, a′ ∈ Aki,h and Ai ⊆ ∪j∈JB2εk(aj).
Let u¯i,h be the restriction of ui,h to A
k
i,h×
∑i′k
i=1 α
′
i
∑hi
h=1 αi,hM(A
k
i,h). Choose open
neighborhoods Vi,h of the functions u¯i,h such that the family of these neighborhoods is
disjoint and Au ∩ Bηk(ai,h) 6= ∅ whenever u ∈ Vi,h; this latter requirement is possible
because u 7→ Au is lower hemicontinuous. Set Vk =
⋃
i,h Vi,h and define sk : Vk → A
by setting sk(u) = ai,h if u ∈ Vi,h.
Define νk by setting
νk =
i′k∑
i=1
α′i
hi∑
h=1
αi,h1u¯i,h and τk =
i′k∑
i=1
α′i
hi∑
h=1
αi,h1(u¯i,h,ai,h).
Note that νk ◦ s−1k = τk,A = τ ′k,A and E(νk) =
∑i′k
i=1 α
′
i
∑hi
h=1 αi,hM(A
k
i,h). Thus,
νk ∈ G∗εk and τk ∈ Sεk(νk).
Furthermore, ξ(E(νk), E(ν
′
k)) ≤ 2εk. Letting ω(2εk) = supu∈U sup{|u(a, pi) −
u(a′, pi′)| : a, a′ ∈ Au, pi, pi′ ∈ M(A), d(a, a′) ≤ 2εk, ρ(pi, pi′) ≤ 2εk}, we have that
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d(u¯i,h, ui) ≤ 2εk + ω(2εk) for each (i, k) and that
ρ(τk, τ
′
k) ≤
i′k∑
i=1
α′i
hi∑
h=1
αi,hρ
(
1(u¯i,h,ai,h), 1(ui,ai,h)
) ≤ i′k∑
i=1
α′i
hi∑
h=1
αi,hd(u¯i,h, ui).
Thus ρ(τk, τ
′
k) → 0 as k → ∞, because εk → 0. Because τ ′k → τ narrowly, it follows
that τk → τ narrowly. In particular, νk → ν narrowly. Together with the fact that
supp(ν ′k) → supp(ν) in the Hausdorff metric topology, the fact that d(u¯i,h, ui) ≤
εk + ω(2εk) for each (i, h) and εk → 0 also implies that supp(νk) → supp(ν) in that
topology. Thus νk → ν in the topology of G.
A.4 Proofs
A.4.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We establish the lemma for the general case where A is compact and metric.
(Sufficiency) Let U ⊆ U be closed, bounded and equicontinuous, and 〈uk〉 be a
sequence in U . Let B > 0 be such that |u(a, pi)| ≤ B for each u ∈ U , a ∈ A and
pi ∈ M(A) such that (a, pi) ∈ dom(u). As the space of the nonempty and compact
subsets of A×M(A)×[−B,B] is compact, we may assume that 〈graph(uk)〉 converges;
let C = limk graph(uk). It thus remains to show that there exists u ∈ U such that
graph(u) = C (indeed, we will then have that uk → u and that u ∈ U since U is
closed).
Note first that
projA×M(A)(C) = projA(C)× projM(A)(C).
We clearly have projA×M(A)(C) ⊆ projA(C) × projM(A)(C). Regarding the converse,
let (a, pi) ∈ projA(C) × projM(A)(C). Hence, there are a′ ∈ A, pi′ ∈ M(A) and
α, β ∈ [−B,B] such that (a, pi′, α), (a′, pi, β) ∈ C. Since graph(uk) → C, there
exist sequences 〈(ak, pi′k, αk)〉 and 〈(a′k, pik, βk)〉 such that (ak, pi′k, αk) → (a, pi′, α),
(a′k, pik, βk) → (a′, pi, β) and (ak, pi′k, αk), (a′k, pik, βk) ∈ graph(uk) for all k sufficiently
large. Since, for each k, dom(uk) = Ak ×Mk for some Ak ⊆ A and Mk ⊆ M(A),
it follows that (ak, pik, uk(ak, pik)) ∈ graph(uk) for all k sufficiently large. We may,
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taking a subsequence if necessary, assume that 〈uk(ak, pik)〉 converges; letting γ =
limk uk(ak, pik), it follows that (a, pi, γ) ∈ C. Thus, (a, pi) ∈ projA×M(A)(C).
It remain to show that, for each (a, pi) ∈ projA(C)×projM(A)(C), there is a unique
α ∈ [−B,B] such that (a, pi, α) ∈ C; in fact, we can then set dom(u) = projA(C) ×
projM(A)(C) and u(a, pi) = α for each (a, pi) ∈ projA(C) × projM(A)(C). Suppose
not; then there exist (a, pi) ∈ projA(C) × projM(A)(C) and α, β ∈ [−B,B] such that
(a, pi, α), (a, pi, β) ∈ C. Then there exist sequences 〈(ak, pik, αk)〉 and 〈(a′k, pi′k, βk)〉 such
that (ak, pik, αk) → (a, pi, α), (a′k, pi′k, βk) → (a, pi, β) and (ak, pik, αk), (a′k, pi′k, βk) ∈
graph(uk) for all k sufficiently large. Pick 0 < ε < |α − β|; the equicontinuity of U
then implies that, for all k sufficiently large, |αk − βk| = |uk(ak, pik)− uk(a′k, pi′k)| < ε.
Hence, we obtain that |α − β| = limk |αk − βk| ≤ ε < |α − β|, a contradiction. This
contradiction establishes our claim that, for each (a, pi) ∈ projA(C) × projM(A)(C),
there is a unique α ∈ [−B,B] such that (a, pi, α) ∈ C and concludes the proof of the
sufficiency part of the lemma.
(Necessity) Let U ⊆ U be compact. Suppose, in order to get a contradiction, that
U is not bounded. Then there exist sequences 〈uk〉, 〈ak〉 and 〈pik〉, respectively in
U , A and M(A), such that |uk(ak, pik)| → ∞. Since U , A and M(A) are compact,
we may assume that there are u ∈ U , a ∈ A and pi ∈ M(A) such that uk → u,
ak → a and pik → pi. Therefore, limk uk(ak, pik) = u(a, pi) by Lemma 2, contradicting
|uk(ak, pik)| → ∞. This shows that U is bounded.
Suppose next that U is not equicontinuous. Then there exist ε > 0 and sequences
〈uk〉, 〈ak〉, 〈a′k〉, 〈pik〉 and 〈pi′k〉, respectively in U , A, A,M(A) andM(A), such that the
distance between ak and a
′
k goes to zero, the distance between pik and pi
′
k goes to zero
and |uk(ak, pik)− uk(a′k, pi′k)| ≥ ε. Since U , A and M(A) are compact, we may assume
that there are u ∈ U , a ∈ A and pi ∈ M(A) such that uk → u, ak → a and pik → pi.
Therefore, a′k → a and pi′k → pi as well and, hence, limk uk(ak, pik) = limk uk(a′k, pi′k) =
u(a, pi) by Lemma 2. But then we obtain that 0 = limk |uk(ak, pik) − uk(a′k, pi′k)| ≥ ε,
a contradiction. This concludes the proof of the necessity part of the lemma.
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A.4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
(a) Recall that G∗ is the subset of G consisting of those ν that have a strict equilibrium
distribution, i.e. for some equilibrium distribution τ of ν, #(ϕ(u, τA)) = 1 for each
u ∈ supp(ν). As A is finite, we can write A = {a1, . . . , am}.
(b) G∗ is an open subset of G. To see this, suppose ν ∈ G∗ and let τ be an
equilibrium distribution for ν such that #(ϕ(u, τA)) = 1 for each u ∈ supp(ν). For
each j = 1, . . . ,m, let Hj = {u ∈ supp(ν) : ϕ(u, τA) = {aj}}. We have that each Hj is
closed in supp(ν), therefore compact since supp(ν) is. Indeed, if 〈uk〉 is a sequence in
Hj converging to u ∈ U , Lemma 2 implies that u(aj, τA) ≥ u(a, τA) for each a ∈ A.
But #(ϕ(u, τA)) = 1 since u ∈ supp(ν) and, hence, ϕ(u, τA) = {aj}.
We now claim that there is an open neighborhood W of τA and, for each j =
1, . . . ,m, an open set Oj ⊆ U , with Hj ⊆ Oj, such that ϕ(u, pi) = {aj} for each u ∈ Oj
and each pi ∈ W such that (aj, pi) ∈ dom(u). If not, then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
pik → τA, uk → u ∈ Hj and a ∈ A such that (a, pik), (aj, pik) ∈ dom(uk) and uk(a, pik) ≥
uk(aj, pik) (recall that A is finite). Lemma 2 implies that u(a, τA) ≥ u(aj, τA), which
is a contradiction since u ∈ Hj.
In particular, it follows by the above claim that supp(ν) ⊆ ⋃mj=1Oj, and because
the sets Oj, j = 1, . . . ,m, are disjoint, we have a continuous function h :
⋃m
j=1Oj → A
if we set h(u) = aj for each u ∈ Oj. Consequently, there is a neighborhood V of ν in
G such that ν ′ ∈ V implies both that supp(ν ′) ⊆ ⋃mj=1Oj and that the distribution
of h on A induced by ν ′ belongs to W . Thus, for each ν ′ ∈ V , the distribution τ ′ of
idU × h induced by ν ′ is an equilibrium distribution with #(ϕ(u, τ ′A)) = 1 for each
u ∈ supp(ν ′). Thus G∗ is open in G.
(c) G∗ is dense in G. This follows by Lemma 7.
(d) Let ν ∈ G∗ and let 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N be a sequence of games with ν(In,Gn) → ν and
#(In) → ∞. Let τ be an equilibrium distribution for ν such that #(ϕ(u, τA)) = 1
for each u ∈ supp(ν), and let V , Oj, j = 1, . . . ,m, W and h be as in (b). As
ν(In,Gn) → ν there is an N1 ∈ N such that ν(In,Gn) ∈ V for n ≥ N1, and in particular
supp(ν(In,Gn)) ⊆
⋃m
j=1Oj. For such n, define fn : In → A by setting fn(i) = h(Gn(i))
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for each i ∈ In and write τfn,A for the distribution of fn, i.e. for each a ∈ A,
τfn,A({a}) =
#({i ∈ In : fn(i) = a})
#(In)
.
Then τfn,A belongs to W , by the choice of V . In fact, τfn,A → τA because ν(In,Gn) → ν
and τfn,A is equal to the distribution of h induced by ν(In,Gn), i.e. τfn,A = ν(In,Gn) ◦h−1.
For each i ∈ In and n ∈ N, let en,i = 1n−1
∑
j∈In\{i} 1f(j) denote the action distri-
bution induced by the choices of the players other than i. As #(In)→∞, there is an
N ∈ N, with N ≥ N1, such that for n ≥ N , ‖en,i − τA,fn‖ is so small for each i ∈ In
that the fact that τA,fn → τA implies that en,i ∈ W for each i ∈ In. Thus, for such n
and each i ∈ In, ϕ(Gn(i), en,i) = {h(Gn(i))} = {fn(i)}, by the choice of W . Thus fn
is a strict equilibrium for Gn if n ≥ N .
A.4.3 Proof of Theorem 2
(a) Let µ ∈ G∗ and let λ be an equilibrium distribution for µ with #(ϕ(u, λA)) = 1
for each u ∈ supp(µ). Let 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N be a sequence of finite-player games with
ν(In,Gn) → µ and #(In)→∞. Such sequence exists by Lemma 6.
Part (d) of the proof of Theorem 1 applies to yield an N ∈ N and a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium fn of (In, Gn) if n ≥ N such that, for some continuous function
h : O → A, where O ⊆ U is open with supp(µ) ⊆ O, we have both fn(i) = h(Gn(i))
for each i ∈ In and λ = µ ◦ (idU , h)−1. Set λn = ν(In,Gn) ◦ (idU , h)−1 for each n ≥ N .
Then, for n ≥ N , λn equals the distribution of (Gn, fn); because (idU , h) is continuous
and ν(In,Gn) → µ, we have λn → λ narrowly.
(b) Putting (a) and Lemma 7 together proves the theorem.
A.4.4 Proof of Theorem 4
(a) Fix ε > 0. Recall that G∗ε is the subset of G consisting of those ν ∈ G such that
there is an open set V ⊆ U , with supp(ν) ⊆ V , numbers η and δ, with 0 < η <
δ ≤ ε/2, and a continuous function s : V → A, with Au ∩ Bη(s(u)) 6= ∅ for each
u ∈ V , such that u(a′, pi) > u(a, pi) for all u ∈ supp(ν), pi ∈ Bδ(ν ◦ s−1) ∩ E(ν),
a′ ∈ Au ∩Bη(s(u)) and a ∈ Au\Bδ(s(u)).
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(b) G∗ε is open: Fix ν ∈ G∗ε . Choose V , η, δ and s witnessing that ν ∈ G∗ε . Suppose
νn → ν in M. We need to show that νn ∈ G∗ε for all sufficiently large n. To see this,
note first that supp(νn) ⊆ V for large n. In particular, for such n, Au ∩Bη(s(u)) 6= ∅
for all u ∈ supp(νn). Suppose by way of contradiction that along some subsequence
〈νnk〉 of 〈νn〉 we can find unk ∈ supp(νnk), pink ∈ Bδ(νnk ◦ s−1) ∩ E(νnk), a′nk ∈
Aunk ∩Bη(s(unk)) and ank ∈ Aunk\Bδ(s(unk)) such that unk(a′nk , pink) ≤ unk(ank , pink).
Then νnk◦s−1 → ν◦s−1 because s is continuous, and by compactness of supp(ν), A and
M(A) we can assume, by Lemmas 4 and 5, and passing to subsequences if necessary,
that unk → u ∈ supp(ν), pink → pi ∈ E(ν), a′nk → a′ ∈ Au and ank → a ∈ Au. Thus,
u(a′, pi) ≤ u(a, pi) by Lemma 2. On the other hand, using continuity of s and any
metric, we see that pi ∈ Bδ(ν ◦ s−1), a′ ∈ Au ∩ Bη(s(u)) and a ∈ Au\Bδ(s(u)), thus
getting a contradiction to the choice of η, δ and s. Thus V , η, δ and s also witness
that νn ∈ G∗ε for large n.
(c) G∗ε is dense: This follows by Lemma 8.
(d) Let ν ∈ G∗ε and choose V , η, δ and s according to (a). Let 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N
be a sequence of games with νGn → ν and #(In) → ∞. Write In = {1, . . . , kn}
with kn = #(In), and ui for Gn(i). As ν(In,Gn) → ν, there is an N1 ∈ N such that
supp(ν(In,Gn)) ∈ V for n ≥ N1. Thus Aui ∩ Bη(s(ui)) 6= ∅ for each i ∈ In if n ≥ N1.
When each i ∈ In is restricted to choose mixed strategies supported on Bδ(s(ui)),
there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium σn = (σ1, . . . , σkn) for each n ≥ N1. Since
2δ ≤ ε, σn is ε-concentrated. We need to show that there is an N2 ≥ N1 such that σn
is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (when players are unrestricted) if n ≥ N2.
To this end, note first that for each n ≥ N1 and i ∈ In, the expected payoff in the
equilibrium σn is at least as large as the expected payoff at any a ∈ Aui ∩ Bδ(s(ui))
against σn,−i. It therefore suffices to show that, for all n larger than some N2 ≥ N1
and each i ∈ In, the expected payoff at some a∗i ∈ Aui ∩ Bη(s(ui)) against σn,−i is at
least as large as the expected payoff against σn,−i at any a ∈ Aui\Bδ(s(ui)). Because
supp(σn,j) ⊆ Bδ(s(uj)) for all j ∈ In, n ≥ N1, this follows if we can show that there
is an N2 ≥ N1 such that if n ≥ N2, then for any i ∈ In, ui
(
f(i), 1
kn−1
∑
j∈In\{i} 1f(j)
) ≥
ui
(
a, 1
kn−1
∑
j∈In\{i} 1f(j)
)
for any map f : In → A, with f(j) ∈ Bδ(s(uj)) ∩ Auj for
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each j ∈ In, f(i) ∈ Bη(s(ui)) ∩ Aui and any a ∈ Aui\Bδ(s(ui)).
If no such N2 exists, then there is a subsequence 〈(Ih, Gh)〉 of 〈(In, Gn)〉, ih ∈ Ih,
a map fh : Ih → A, with fh(i) ∈ Bδ(s(ui))∩Aui for each i ∈ Ih, fh(ih) ∈ Bη(s(uih))∩
Auih and ah ∈ Auih \Bδ(s(uih)) such that
uih
fh(ih), 1
kh − 1
∑
i∈Ih\{ih}
1fh(i)
 < uih
ah, 1
kh − 1
∑
i∈Ih\{ih}
1fh(i)

for each h. Write νh,i for the distribution of the payoff functions of the players in
Ih\{ih} and note that νh,i → ν. Since fh(i) ∈ Bδ(s(ui)) for each i ∈ Ih, we have
1
kh−1
∑
i∈Ih\{ih}
1f(i) ∈ Bδ
(
1
kh−1
∑
i∈Ih\{ih}
1s(ui)
)
= Bδ(νh,i ◦ s−1)
for each h. Passing to subsequences, if necessary, we can conclude by Lemmas 2, 4
and 5 that, in the limit as h → ∞, there are u ∈ supp(ν), pi ∈ Bδ(ν ◦ s−1) ∩ E(ν),
a′ ∈ Au ∩ Bη(s(u)) and a ∈ Au \ Bδ(s(u)) such that u(a′, pi) ≤ u(a, pi), contradicting
the choices of s, η and δ.
A.4.5 Proof of Theorem 5
(a) Let ε > 0, µ ∈ G∗ε and λ ∈ Sε(µ) (see the text before Lemma 8 for the definition of
Sε(µ)) be such that d(a, a′) > ε for all a, a′ ∈ Au and u ∈ supp(µ). Let 〈(In, Gn)〉n∈N be
a sequence of finite-player games with ν(In,Gn) → µ, #(In)→∞ and supp(ν(In,Gn)) ⊆
supp(µ). Such sequence exists by Lemma 6.
Let V , η, δ and s witness that λ ∈ Sε(µ) and note that supp(ν(In,Gn)) ⊆ V for all n
sufficiently large. Part (d) of the proof of Theorem 4 applies to yield an N ′ ∈ N such
that, for each n ≥ N ′, (In, Gn) has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium σn such that
σn is ε-concentrated and supp(σn,i) ⊆ Bδ(s(ui)) for each i ∈ In. Since d(a, a′) > ε for
all a, a′ ∈ Au and u ∈ supp(ν(In,Gn)), it follows that σn is pure.
We have that ν(In,Gn) ◦ (idU , s)−1 → λ since λ = µ ◦ (idU , s)−1 and (idU , s) :
V → V × A is continuous. Thus, there is N ≥ N ′ such that, for each n ≥ N ,
ρ(ν(In,Gn) ◦ (idU , s)−1, λ) < 1n . Moreover, it follows that
ρ
(∑
i∈In
1(Gn(i),σn(i))/#(In),
∑
i∈In
1(Gn(i),s(i))/#(In)
)
≤ δ.
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Since ν(In,Gn) ◦ (idU , s)−1 =
∑
i∈In 1(Gn(i),s(i))/#(In), it follows that, for each n ≥ N ,
ρ
(∑
i∈In
1(Gn(i),σn(i))/#(In), λ
)
< δ +
1
n
.
(b) Putting (a) and Lemma 8 together proves the theorem.
A.5 First-price auctions
We shall use the following notation: For each v ∈ R+, let uv : A × M(A) → R
be defined by uv(a, pi) = Φ(a, pi)(v − a) for each (a, pi) ∈ A ×M(A). Moreover, we
write ϕ(v, pi) instead of ϕ(uv, pi). Also, for each pi ∈ M(A), we let A0(pi) = {a ∈ A :
Φ(a, pi) = 0}.
Lemma 9. If ν ∈ G˜ and τ is an equilibrium distribution of ν, then τA(p∗(τA)) > 0
and Φ(p∗(τA), τA) > 0.
Proof. Indeed, if τA(p
∗(τA)) = 0, then
∑
p≥p∗(τA)+1 τA(p) =
∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) ≥ 1/k
and, hence, max{p ∈ A : ∑p′≥p τA(p′)} > p∗(τA), a contradiction. Moreover, if
Φ(p∗(τA), τA) = 0, then
∑
p≥p∗(τA)+1 τA(p) = 1/k and we reach the same contra-
diction.
Lemma 10. Φ is continuous at each (a, pi) ∈ A ×M(A) such that ∑p≥p∗(pi) pi(p) >
1/k.
Proof. This is clear, because if 〈pij〉 is a sequence in M(A) converging to such pi, we
have that p∗(pij)→ p∗(pi).
Given ν ∈ G˜ and an equilibrium distribution τ of ν, we say that τ is essentially
strict if
∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) > 1/k and, for each u ∈ supp(ν),
ϕ(u, τA) =
{a} if Φ(a, τA) > 0 for some a ∈ A with (u, a) ∈ supp(τ),A0(τA) otherwise.
Let G˜∗ be the set of ν ∈ G˜ that have an essentially strict equilibrium distribution.
46
Lemma 11. If ν ∈ G˜ and τ is an equilibrium distribution of ν, then there exists
〈(νn, τn)〉n∈N such that νn ∈ G˜∗ and τn is an essentially strict equilibrium distribution
of νn for all n ∈ N, νn → ν in the topology of G˜ and τn → τ narrowly.
Proof. Let ν ∈ G˜ and τ be an equilibrium distribution of ν. Given ν ′ ∈ G˜ and an
equilibrium distribution τ ′ of ν ′, we say that τ is almost strict if, for each u ∈ supp(ν),
ϕ(u, τA) =
{a} if Φ(a, τA) > 0 for some a ∈ A with (u, a) ∈ supp(τ),A0(τA) otherwise.
Therefore, τ is essentially strict if and only if τ is almost strict and such that∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) > 1/k. To simplify the notation, we will write p
∗ for p∗(τA) and,
for each a ∈ A, Φ(a) for Φ(a, τA).
(a) We first show that there exists 〈(νn, τn)〉n∈N such that τn is an almost strict
equilibrium distribution of νn for all n ∈ N, νn → ν in the topology of G and τn → τ
narrowly.
To see this, first note that supp(τA) ⊆ {p∗, p∗ + 1} ∪A0(τA) since it does not pay
to bid more that p∗ + 1 as Φ(p∗ + 1) = 1.
Consider first the case where p∗ = 0. In this case A0(τA) = ∅ by Lemma 9 and
there can only be indifference between p∗ and p∗ + 1, which happens for v¯ ∈ R+
satisfying v¯ − 1 = Φ(0)v¯, i.e. v¯ = 1
1−Φ(0) (of course, if Φ(0) = 1, then 1 = p
∗ + 1 is
not in the support of τA because choosing 0 is strictly better than choosing 1 for any
v ∈ R+; in this case, τ is essentially strict). Thus, for ε > 0, define
τε = τ + τ({(v¯, 0)})
(
1(v¯−ε,0) − 1(v¯,0)
)
+ τ({(v¯, 1)}) (1(v¯+ε,1) − 1(v¯,1)) .
By letting νε = τε,R+ and ε→ 0, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Consider next the case where p∗ > 0. Indifference can occur between any element
of A0(τA) and p
∗ when v ∈ R+ is such that 0 = Φ(p∗)(v − p∗), i.e. v = p∗. Moreover,
indifference can occur between p∗ and p∗ + 1 when v ∈ R+ is such that v − p∗ − 1 =
Φ(p∗)(v − p∗), i.e. v = p∗ + 1
1−Φ(p∗) (as before, we can discard this last indifference if
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Φ(p∗) = 1). Thus, for ε > 0, define
τε = τ +
∑
a∈A0(τA)
τ({(p∗, a)}) (1(p∗−ε,a) − 1(p∗,a))
+τ({(p∗, p∗)}) (1(p∗+ε,p∗) − 1(p∗,p∗))
+τ({(p∗ + 1
1− Φ(p∗) , p
∗)})
(
1(p∗+ 1
1−Φ(p∗)−ε,p∗) − 1(p∗+ 11−Φ(p∗) ,p∗)
)
+τ({(p∗ + 1
1− Φ(p∗) , p
∗ + 1)})
(
1(p∗+ 1
1−Φ(p∗)+ε,p
∗+1) − 1(p∗+ 1
1−Φ(p∗) ,p
∗+1)
)
.
By letting νε = τε,R+ and ε→ 0, we obtain the desired conclusion.
(b) By part (a), we may assume that τ is almost strict and that
∑
p≥p∗ τA(p) =
1/k. Because supp(τA) ⊆ A0(τA)∪{p∗, p∗+1}, we have that τA(p∗)+τA(p∗+1) = 1/k
and, hence, Φ(p∗) = 1. Since τ is almost strict, it then follows that τA(p∗ + 1) = 0,
1
k
= τA(p
∗) = ν((p∗,∞)) and 1 − 1
k
= ν([0, p∗)). Pick v∗ ∈ supp(ν) ∩ (p∗,∞) and
define, for a given ε > 0,
τε = ε1(v∗,p∗) + (1− ε)τ.
Then τε,A(p
∗) = ε + (1 − ε) 1
k
> 1
k
and p∗(τε,A) = p∗. In addition, Φ(p∗, τε,A) =
1
1+(k−1)ε and, therefore, to check that τε is essentially strict, it suffices to show that
uv(p
∗, τε,A) > uv(0, τε,A) = 0 and uv(p∗, τε,A) > uv(p∗ + 1, τε,A) for each v ∈ supp(ν) ∩
(p∗,∞). The former holds since uv(p∗, τε,A) = Φ(p∗, τε,A)(v−p∗) > 0 since v ∈ (p∗,∞).
The latter holds for all sufficiently small ε > 0: Indeed, letting v¯ = max supp(ν), pick
ε > 0 such that Φ(p∗, τε,A) > 1 − 1v¯−p∗ . Hence, for each v ∈ supp(ν) ∩ (p∗,∞),
Φ(p∗, τε,A) > 1 − 1v−p∗ and, thus, uv(p∗, τε,A) = Φ(p∗, τε,A)(v − p∗) > v − p∗ − 1 =
uv(p
∗+1, τε,A). By letting νε = τε,R+ and ε→ 0, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Lemma 12. If ν ∈ G˜ and τ is an equilibrium distribution of ν, then there exists
〈(νn, τn)〉n∈N such that νn → ν in the topology of G˜, τn → τ narrowly and, for each
n ∈ N, νn ∈ G˜∗, τn is an essentially strict equilibrium distribution of νn, supp(τn) is
finite and
τn =
∑
v∈supp(νn)
νn(v)1(v,av),
where av ∈ A for each v ∈ supp(νn).
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Proof. Let ν ∈ G˜ and τ be an equilibrium distribution of ν. Due to Lemma 11, we
may assume that τ is essentially strict. As before, we will write p∗ for p∗(τA) and, for
each a ∈ A, Φ(a) for Φ(a, τA). Thus,
τ =
∑
a∈A0(τA)
τA(a)τa + τA(p
∗)τp∗ + τA(p∗ + 1)τp∗+1,
where, for each a ∈ A0(τA) ∪ {p∗, p∗ + 1}, τa is the Borel probability measure on
R+ × A defined by setting, for each Borel B ⊆ R+ and a′ ∈ A,
τa(B × {a′}) = τ(B × {a})
τA(a)
if a′ = a and τa(B × {a′}) = 0 if a′ 6= a. Since τ is essentially strict, we have
that supp(τa) ⊆ [0, p∗] × A0(τA), supp(τp∗) ⊆ [p∗, p∗ + (1 − Φ(p∗))−1] × {p∗} and
supp(τp∗+1) ⊆ [p∗ + (1−Φ(p∗))−1,∞)× {p∗ + 1}. For each a ∈ A0(τA)∪ {p∗, p∗ + 1},
there exists 〈τn,a〉 such that (i) τn,a → τa narrowly, (ii) the sequence of the marginals of
τn,a on R+ converges to the marginal of τa on R+ in the topology of G˜, (iii) supp(τn,a)∩
{p∗, p∗ + (1 − Φ(p∗))−1} = ∅ and (iv) supp(τn,a) ∩ supp(τn,a′) = ∅ for each a′ 6= a.
Thus, put
τn =
∑
a∈A0(τA)
τA(a)τn,a + τA(p
∗)τn,p∗ + τA(p∗ + 1)τn,p∗+1
for each n ∈ N.
A.5.1 Proof of Theorem 6
(a) Recall that G˜∗ is the set of those ν ∈ G˜ that have an essentially strict equilibrium
distribution τ ; thus,
∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) > 1/k and, for each u ∈ supp(ν),
ϕ(u, τA) =
{a} if Φ(a, τA) > 0 for some a ∈ A with (u, a) ∈ supp(τ),A0(τA) otherwise.
As A is finite, we can write A = {a1, . . . , am}.
(b) G˜∗ is an open subset of G˜. To see this, suppose ν ∈ G˜∗ and let τ be an
essentially strict equilibrium distribution for ν. In particular,
∑
p≥p∗(τA) τA(p) > 1/k
and, hence, Φ is continuous at (a, τA) for each a ∈ A by Lemma 10.
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We may assume that τA(A0(τA)) = τA(0). Indeed, let f : A → A be defined by
setting, for each a ∈ A,
f(a) =
0 if Φ(a, τA) = 0,a otherwise.
We then have that τˆ := τ ◦ (idR+ × f)−1 is also essentially strict since, by Lemma 9,
p∗(τA) 6∈ A0(τA) and, hence, p∗(τˆA) = p∗(τA). And, clearly, τˆA(A0(τA)) = τˆA(0).
For each j = 1, . . . ,m, let Hj = {v ∈ supp(ν) : ϕ(v, τA) = {aj}}; let Hm+1 =
supp(ν) \ ⋃mj=1Hj. We have that each Hj is closed in supp(ν), therefore compact
since supp(ν) is. Indeed, using the continuity of Φ at (a, τA) for each a ∈ A, if 〈vk〉 is
a sequence in Hj converging to v ∈ R+, then uv(aj, τA) ≥ uv(a, τA) for each a ∈ A,
letting am+1 be any element of A0(τA). Since v ∈ supp(ν), the properties of τ imply
that ϕ(v, τA) = {aj} if j 6= m+ 1 and ϕ(v, τA) = A0(τA) if j = m+ 1.
Using again the continuity of Φ at (a, τA) for each a ∈ A, it follows that there is
an open neighborhood W of τA and, for each j = 1, . . . ,m+1, an open set Oj ⊆ R+,
with Hj ⊆ Oj, such that p∗(pi) = p∗(τA),
∑
p≥p∗(τA) pi(p) > 1/k and
ϕ(v, pi) =
{aj} if j 6= m+ 1,A0(τA) if j = m+ 1
for each v ∈ Oj and each pi ∈ W .
In particular, it follows by the above claim that supp(ν) ⊆ ⋃m+1j=1 Oj, and be-
cause the sets Oj, j = 1, . . . ,m + 1, are disjoint, we have a continuous function
h :
⋃m+1
j=1 Oj → A if we set h(u) = aj for each u ∈ Oj and j 6= m+1 and h(u) = 0 for
each u ∈ Om+1. Consequently, there is a neighborhood V of ν in G˜ such that ν ′ ∈ V
implies both that supp(ν ′) ⊆ ⋃m+1j=1 Oj and that the distribution of h on A induced
by ν ′ belongs to W . Thus, for each ν ′ ∈ V , the distribution τ ′ of idU × h induced by
ν ′ is an equilibrium distribution witnessing that ν ′ ∈ G˜∗. Thus G˜∗ is open in G˜.
(c) G˜∗ is dense in G˜. This follows by Lemma 11.
(d) The remainder of the proof is as part (d) of the proof of Theorem 1.
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A.5.2 Proof of Theorem 7
The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 with the following modification.
Let ν ∈ G˜∗ and let τ be an essentially strict equilibrium distribution for ν such that
supp(τ) is finite and
τ =
∑
v∈supp(ν)
ν(v)1(v,av),
where av ∈ A for each v ∈ supp(ν). We will write p∗ for p∗(τA) and, for each a ∈ A,
Φ(a) for Φ(a, τA).
For each a ∈ {p∗, p∗ + 1}, let Ha = {v ∈ supp(ν) : ϕ(v, τA) = {a}} and, for each
a ∈ A0(τA), let Ha = {v ∈ supp(ν) : (v, a) ∈ supp(τ)}. As in the proof of part (a) of
Theorem 6, we obtain an open neighborhood W of τA and, for each a ∈ A0(τA) ∪
{p∗, p∗ + 1}, an open set Oa ⊆ R+, with Ha ⊆ Oa and Oa ∩ Oa′ = ∅ for each a′ 6= a,
such that p∗(pi) = p∗(τA),
∑
p≥p∗(τA) pi(p) > 1/k, and
ϕ(v, pi) =
{a} if a ∈ {p
∗, p∗ + 1},
A0(τA) otherwise
for each v ∈ Oa and each pi ∈ W . Define h :
⋃
a∈A0(τA)∪{p∗,p∗+1}Oa → A by setting
h(u) = a for each u ∈ Oa; then h is continuous.
The remainder of the argument is analogous to the proof of of Theorem 2, using
Lemma 12 instead of Lemma 7.
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